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Abstract 
The ten essays contained herein are the first in a series of twenty prepared for translation into 
Russian and publication in Moscow's Independent Gazette. Their translation into Russian will 
incorporate a number of details particular to Russia that are not included in the current English 
versions. In any event, these essays are predicated on the assumption that Russians know democracy 
only in superficial and sometimes inaccurate ways - - that they fail to appreciate the interrelationships 
of constitutional institutions, of extra-constitutional structures, and of the give-and-take of 
democratic process that sometimes seems chaotic to those unaccustomed to the interplay of these 
institutions and structures. Support for this project was provided by the University of Maryland's 
project on Institutional Reform and The Informal Sector (IRIS). We also would like to thank Olga 
Shvetsova for her suggestions on topics that require coverage and her comments on the essays' specific 
content. 
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Russia's Transition to Democracy: Essays 1-10 
I. A Democratic Russia: Just Another Ill-Conceived Experiment? 
As citizens slumber with resignation and foreboding, draft constitutions are prepared, discussed, 
rejected, and rewritten; political leaders, mouthing patriotic slogans, follow the dictates of 
unrestrained personal ambition; public officials consolidate their power; days are spent debating the 
name of a country that threatens dissolution; optimistic economic projections yield only new 
projections of a similar form; the ruble threatens to become Russia's chief export - - as wallpaper; and 
executive and legislative branches contend for supremacy in a disintegrating state. As the pie. shrinks, 
the self -serving fight harder for their piece, and citizens in general scramble for crumbs. The basis 
for pessimism are everywhere, and it is not unreasonable for Russia's citizens to react to their brief 
experiment with democracy with the plea "please . . .  no more experiments!" 
Certainly, Russians today confront one of the most daunting tasks that has ever challenged a 
people. New political institutions must be designed and set in place and new traditions of political 
discourse must be invented to guide the evolution of revolutionary economic relations at a time of 
severe economic dislocation. Although similar challenges may have confronted smaller and less 
complex societies, few people of a continental scope with global interests have attempted such a 
transition under such circumstances. Nevertheless, as daunting as the task appears, there are reasons 
for believing that the challenge can be met. First, there are the facts of Russia's highly educated 
citizenry, her generously endowed geography, and her rich cultural heritage. Second, there is the 
evident desire of the Russian people for a just society. And third, Russia has the opportunity to 
benefit from the experiences of those other states that have sought to move from autocratic to 
democratic rule. Some of these attempts have been successful; a great many others have been 
otherwise. But those experiences, successful or otherwise, offer valuable lessons for those who seek 
a stable and prosperous Russia. 
In fact, despite its recent appearance in Russia, democracy is no longer an experiment. More than 
two hundred years have passed since the Americans implemented their constitution, and we have 
learned a great deal in the interim. The study of politics remains an imperfect science, and no one 
argues that democracy can be implemented quickly and easily in a society experiencing severe 
economic deprivation and ethnic conflict. But one fact is clear -- democracy takes root if society has 
the will abide by its rules and if everyone is conscious of that will. 
Hence, in this and a number of essays to follow, we will survey the lessons of democracy offered 
by its successes and failures. Setting these lessons in the context of current circumstances, we will 
proceed under the supposition that with but some nurturing and attention to proper matters, 
democracy and prosperity will come to Russia. We proceed on this journalistic venture first and most 
importantly because everyone who seeks to find their way in a new democratic state must become 
familiar with its operation, must understand what it is that democratic process can and cannot do, and 
must appreciate their responsibilities in it. The failure of any significant part of society to understand 
these things is the fertile ground upon which the potential despot sows his seed. We also address those 
with political ambition. Any significant failure to appreciate the role of constitutional limits on 
action, such as the sanctity of a free press (however personally uncomfortable that freedom might 
seem from time to time), of the necessity for upholding the rule of law even when adherence to it 
yields outcomes with which one disagrees, and of the conflicts inherent in the colloquy of a free 
people dooms a political system to instability or ineffectiveness. 
Just as people must learn the grammar of their language to avoid being misled by those who would 
take advantage of their illiteracy, people must learn the grammar of-democratic politics. Most of us 
learn language at an age when we are barely conscious of the fact of our learning. And although most 
of us cannot formally specify grammatical rules, we abide by those rules instinctively and leave 
formal understanding to linguists and teachers. So it is with the rules of democratic process. Few 
Americans, Costa Ricans, Swedes, Swiss, or Germans, can recite constitutional clauses; but these 
citizens possess an instinctive understanding of the rules of democratic process. In contrast, Russia 
must learn and adapt to a "language" with which they are largely unfamiliar. And as with any new 
language, the initial stages of learning will result in innumerable errors and frustration. 
Fortunately, the "grammatical rules" of democratic process are not complex. But "grammatical 
errors" here can be especially dangerous, so steps must be taken to minimize their occurrence. Part 
of the process of learning these rules is to understand what is of primary importance and what is of 
secondary concern, and to appreciate that the things that are discussed most loudly are not always the 
most important issues. For example, although the relative power of a president versus a legislature 
is not unimportant, focusing on this issue alone can distract us from even more fundamental concerns. 
Such debates often only reflect a power struggle among a small coterie of persons, so that only the 
struggle itself effects us -- not its ultimate resolution. Political systems have survived and prospered 
with weak presidents (e.g., Finland and Austria) and with strong ones (e.g., America, France, Costa 
Rica). And most systems have seen the powers of a president change with circumstances. America 
began with a constitutionally weak president that was transformed by the personalities that held office 
(Washington, Jackson, Lincoln); it entered its post Civil-War period in 1870 with a considerably 
weaker office that was transformed once again in this century by such leaders as Roosevelts, Johnson 
and Reagan. In fact, other matters such as the composition of Russia's federal system and the ways 
in what that system influence inter-ethnic and territorial conflicts are the things that ultimately 
determine Russia's stability. The relevance of presidential versus legislative powers is important 
primarily to the extent that it is part of the equation determining federal relations. 
More generally, one of the things we want to accomplish in this column is to bring the reader's 
attention what it is that is of central importance in structuring the democratic state and what is merely 
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of derivative concern. Of necessity, we will discuss such issues as: the advantages and disadvantages 
of presidential government; the rights a constitution can and cannot be expected to protect; alternative 
relationships between legislative and executive branches of government; the essential components of 
a federal state; the advantages to ethnically distinct societies of participating in such a state; the role 
of political parties in ameliorating conflict; and the influence on parties of alternative electoral 
procedures, designs of representative assemblies, and federal relationships. At times we will focus 
on details such as the advisability of constitutional emergency and secession clauses, the organization 
of political parties, and alternative voting procedures; at other times we will discuss more general 
things such as the obligations of democratic citizenship and the legitimate political function of "non­
political" organizations. 
However, in discussing such things we will attempt to show how these various pieces "fit together;" 
how each is part of a general mosaic that determines the operation of a democratic state; and why it 
is impossible, generally, to discern the impact of one component of the design without assessing its 
function relative to all other components. 
More generally, most of the things that will concern us will focus on the institutional components 
of a democracy -- constitutional design, election laws, and legislative and executive prerogatives. 
This is as it should be because the first lesson of democracy is that all democratic processes proceed 
in accordance with rules and procedures, both implicit and explicit, that lie outside the control of any 
single individual or oligarchy. The solution to Russia's current problems does not require that we find 
the "right leader" or implement precisely the "right policy." Although we prefer to avoid incompetent 
leadership or foolhardy policy, the solution resides ultimately in establishing political institutions and 
traditions that will direct the actions of political leaders and society's citizens in the right way. 
In the democratic state, persons will be elected to high office with gross deficiencies of character 
and talent -- democracy does not ensure perfection in our choices (many a fool has been called to 
leadership in even the most stable and prosperous democracy). But if our political institutions are 
well-crafted and if we hold a consensual or near-consensual determination to abide by the rules of 
those institutions, then the normal processes of the democratic state will compensate for such 
deficiencies. 
The experiences of other states also tell us that the institutions of democracy come in many forms 
-- there is no singularly perfect design. However, the second lesson of democracy is that, regardless 
of the structure ultimately agreed to, the pieces must fit together and match contemporary 
circumstances. In Russia today, of course, the most salient matters are: a tradition of strong, 
centralizing leadership that has too easily fallen prey to despotism; a society imbued with a deep sense 
of patriotism but divided by innumerable regional, ethnic, linguistic, and religious loyalties; and an 
economy that functions imperfectly if it functions at all, but any change necessarily requires severe 
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social dislocation and personal hardship. Russia's new political institutions must provide a way to 
contend with these realities. But they can contend successfully only if together they establish 
incentives on everyone's part to seek peaceful resolutions or, minimally, to forego conflict even if 
individuals experience temporary policy setbacks. 
The third lesson of democracy, though, is that the conflicts inherent in these realities cannot be 
negotiated at the same time as a new democratic state is designed and implemented. The Americans, 
for example, sought to negotiate two conflicts in their constitutional document - - the dominance of 
large states over small ones and the future of slavery. The first conflict soon proved irrelevant and 
today Americans take little note of the fact that small and seemingly insignificant states such·asNew 
Hampshire or Delaware share equal representation in one branch of the legislature with California, 
which if an independent country, would place it in the top rank of global economies. And by 
attempting a constitutional resolution of the second conflict, the Americans merely set the stage for 
their civil war -- one of the bloodiest wars in human history to that time. 
Russia, then, must focus on the institutional structures it will employ to guide the resolution of 
whatever conflicts exist today and in the future. She must do this with the understanding that the 
exact form of that resolution as well as the nature of future conflicts cannot be predicted with 
certainty. But if her institutions are designed well, the people's interests will ultimately be served. 
The fourth lesson of democracy is that citizens should be expected to favor politicians who 
espouse policies they perceive to be in their interest and to oppose (by legal means) those who 
advocate contrary measures. That is their right. But at the same time, they must learn that political 
leaders should not be judged merely on the basis of the policies they advocate, however attractive or 
unattractive the emotional appeal. Their commitment to democratic process is equally if not more 
important. People should be prepared to support the politician, citizen, or organization that, even 
when advocating an unfavorable policy, does so in conformity with democratic practice; and they 
should be prepared at the same time to oppose those who, regardless of the seeming attractiveness of 
the policies they advocate, proceed otherwise. At the same time, those with political ambition should 
appreciate that other countries honor the founders of their democracies not because of any particular 
policy -- only the professional historian recalls specifics. Instead, they are honored because of their 
commitment to democratic process that was sustained in the face of seemingly inescapable imperatives 
to act otherwise. 
Much of what we have said, of course, may seem utopian. But our task in the essays to follow will 
be to show that aspiring to these ends is not mere utopianism -- that there are practical ways to 
achieve them. The rules of democracy we offer here are something more than mere exhortations. 
Political institutions can be designed so that people will find it in their self-interest to act in 
accordance with these rules. Two hundred years ago, James Madison wrote in defense of the 
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American constitution that "the seeds of faction are sown in the nature of man," and that "if men were 
angels, no government would be necessary." Proceeding under these same assumptions keeps us from 
utopian fallacies and, with the success of other societies in mind, disallows undue pessimism. 
2. Constitutional Rights: Mere Words or Sustainable Guarantees?
Russia is schizophrenic. On the one hand, it is skeptical about democracy as a route to a 
prosperous future and, based on experience, about the value of a constitution as a meaningful 
guarantor of individual rights and civil liberties. On the other hand, those who would write a 
democratic constitution off er drafts replete with promises, directives, and rights in the apparent belief 
that every word will be faithfully executed, or at least that any ambiguity will necessarily yield 
distasteful results. 
Addressing the sources of this schizophrenia and achieving any resolution of it requires that we 
move to first-principles -- to the ways in which democracy achieves the end of preserving an 
expanding individual rights. We begin by noting that establishing any state requires granting its 
various parts the right to coordinate society, through coercion if necessary, so it can accomplish things 
it cannot accomplish otherwise. Thus, acting as our agent, we allow the state to tax and to spend, to 
draft, to legislate, and, in the event of illegality, to imprison. In ages past this coercive and 
coordinative function, serving the interests of a small elite, fell to monarchs. Today, democracies are 
constituted with the understanding that the state should serve only with the consent of the governed 
and that the governed hold the ultimate voice in how the state acts. 
The great trick of democratic design, though, lies in constructing the state so that public officials 
do not exceed their authority. And an important part of this "trick" is the constitution, which in 
addition to defining the components the state and their relationship to each other and to the people, 
sets limits on the state's power. But in drafting such a document two great questions arise. The first 
is: How can a piece of paper control anything, let alone those who direct the state's coercive parts and 
who might aspire to despotism or whose ego might lead them to believe that only they know what is 
best? The second question is: What is it that properly belongs in such a document -- what should be 
made specific, what should be made ambiguous, and what issues should it confront? 
These two questions converge when drafting constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights -­
those individual rights that define a free and just society. Some of these rights are well-understood 
and appear in virtually every democratic constitution, such as a guarantee of religious freedom, of 
the freedom of the press, of the right to peaceful assembly, of the inviolability of personal property, 
of equality in the right to vote, and of the right to a speedy and fair trial. The inclusion of other 
rights are more controversial, such as the right to equal housing, employment, and just compensation 
for labor. Our two questions, then, combine to form a third, namely: Why is this second category 
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of rights -- found in earlier Soviet and some Western European constitutions -- controversial whereas 
those in the first category are not? 
Before we address this question, there is a related matter that requires attention -- the advisability 
of including citizen obligations or duties in a constitution. Put simply, such clauses -- requiring, for 
example, that "man's exercise of his rights and liberties must not . . .  be detrimental to the public weal 
or surrounding environment," that "everyone . . .  display concern for the preservation of the historical 
and cultural heritage .. ., " that "everyone .. .  pay taxes . . .  in the procedure and amounts established by 
law" or that "parents have the obligation to raise and support their children" -- pervert the function 
of the constitution, serve no useful purpose, and ·are dangerous. First, they pervert constitutions 
because the diffuse the original intent of such documents -- keeping states from tyranny. Thus, a 
constitution defines and places limits on the state and not on the sovereign, the people. Second, such 
clauses serve no useful purpose, because, if people choose to place limits on themselves, they can do 
so through their representative assemblies, via the laws they allow those assemblies to pass. Finally, 
such lists are dangerous because they establish the precedent that, beyond ensuring that no person 
infringes on the rights of any other, the constitution can be used to control and limit rights rather 
than expand and protect them. 
Of course, we should not suppose that such clauses arise from sinister motives. Rather, we can 
attribute them to the fear of ambiguity, especially when it appears that the full expression of one 
person's rights might conflict with some other person's or "with the public weal." But here it is best 
to rely on a legislative or judicial resolution. If the other parts of our constitution are designed well, 
we can rely on the institutional structure a constitution establishes to reach a just accommodation 
(and, as we argue shortly, if they are designed poorly, then it matters little what rights we specify). 
Moreover, the process of adjudicating rights, if done in the context of a political system that is itself 
deemed legitimate, can move us to a new consensus on rights far more easily than any convoluted 
constitutional language. 
Turning then to our central question -- about rights that belong in a constitution -- part of the 
answer is provided by noting that certain rights ("aspirations") can be provided through the normal 
processes of government if other rights are secure. If citizens remain free to engage in political 
discourse, free to be informed by a viable press, and free to vote to displace one set of leaders with 
another, then they can use the agencies of the state so as to secure such aspirations as fair 
compensation for labor (minimum wage legislation), safe working conditions (occupational safety 
regulations), adequate housing (state housing subsidies based on income, a viable banking system for 
financing private housing loans), pensions (social security), and health care (public health insurance, 
government sponsored medical research). But if they lose their basic rights, then attainment or 
retention of these things is at best problematical and at worst, subject to the whim of an otherwise 
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tyrannical state. Indeed, a society unable to partake of its fundamental rights has no protection 
against the avaricious official who acts in his or her narrow self-interest, regardless of the aspirations 
otherwise provided for in a constitution. 
This is not to say that it is improper to cite aspirations. But they should be identified as flexible 
goals, rather than as inflexible constraints. Clauses outlining a legislature's jurisdiction, for example, 
can admonish the state to be concerned with just compensation for labor, adequate health care, and 
the sanctity of private contracts consensually agreed to. On the other hand, a requirement that the 
state ensure just compensation or guarantee medical care opens the door to contentious judicial and 
political processes as people attempt to decide Whether, for example, specific pieces of legislation 
move us close enough to the required goal. Should we declare a medical care bill unconstitutional 
because it only takes us part way to a wholly comprehensive solution to public health or would we 
prefer the view such legislation is an essential first step toward satisfying such a goal? More 
problematical is the fact that the state may be unable to satisfy such requirements, in which case its 
failure to satisfy these "rights" undermines people's confidence that it will act to ensure any other. 
Basic rights and aspirations, then, ought to be cleanly differentiated within a constitution. Indeed, 
drafters of constitutions should seriously consider whether aspirations should be made irrelevant to 
a court's deliberations over the constitutionality of legislation, because in these instances the court can 
focus on whether the implementing legislation is in conformity with other parts of the constitution, 
most notably the fundamental rights it provides for. 
Turning, then, to fundamental rights, the safest way to approach matters is with a healthy dose 
of cynicism about how government officials will try to interpret various provisions. The prudent 
assumption is that these officials -- legislators, bureaucrats, and the like -- will operate in their own 
self-interest, regardless of whether that interest corresponds to society's. And although the other 
parts of the constitution should ensure that these motives are the correct ones, history has taught us 
the value of additional precautions. 
Among these precautions is a succinct statement of each right. Long, convoluted clauses cannot 
substitute for simple admonitions. Compare, for example, the provision that the legislature "shall pass 
no law abridging the freedom of the press" with the more ambiguously identified 'right' that "the 
media are free .. .  [but] the seizure and confiscation of information material and the hardware for its 
preparation and transmission are permitted only in accordance with a ruling by a court of law." 
Although such qualification may be designed to clarify, to qualify, and to render a constitution 
flexible in the event of unforeseen contingencies, it opens the door to judicial confusion as to original 
intent, and gives both the bureaucrat and politician room to circumvent that intent. Clear and direct 
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specifications of rights provide the court, moreover, with a valuable weapon in their defense of rights 
and in their inevitable conflicts with executive and legislative branches over them. 
It may be true, of course, that society may choose to adhere to certain qualifications (like a 
prohibition against shouting "fire" in a crowded theater). But as with those instances in which rights 
might conflict, the way in which such qualifications are best arrived at as a social consensus reached 
through the operation of legitimate political process rather than through constitutional edict. If 
consensual -- if such qualifications assume the role of a social norm about civil conduct -- then they 
can be easily specified and enforced through normal channels of legislation. 
We arrive finally at the most fundamental question, namely: How are· basic rights enforced? 
Certainly we should not suppose that merely setting words to paper provides any iron-clad guarantee. 
Too much history, some of it Russian, tells us otherwise. Instead, the answer lies in the incentives 
of public officials that other parts of the constitution establish. Constitutions seek to do more than 
merely define the various branches of the state with the idea that a bill of rights will protect us 
against any usurpation of power by these branches. The institutions a constitution establishes controls 
the aspirations of officials by "setting ambition against ambition." It accomplishes this in part by 
creating a balance of power among the separate branches of government - - executive, legislative, and 
judicial. It does this also by not only allowing politicians to serve only with the approval of voters, 
but also by giving different branches of the government a different relation to the people. Thus, a 
president is elected directly by all citizens; legislators are elected by smaller constituencies; and the 
court is selected indirectly by the people through joint legislative-executive action. In this way 
political leaders confront each other with as great a variety of interests as possible, so that public 
policy must be passed with some minimal level of consensus. Further, in large or heterogeneous states 
such as Russia, the United States, and Switzerland, we have as well a federal governmental structure 
that allows citizens to control as much of their destiny as possible in a part of government closest to 
them and ensures that local and regional concerns are given full weight at the national governmental 
level. 
All of this structure influences the incentives of political leaders to protect rights. If the system 
is designed correctly -- if political careers depend on protecting rights or ensuring against 
bureaucratic infringement of rights - - then those rights are preserved; but if the system is designed 
otherwise, then those rights are mere words. Civil rights frequently succumbed to political ambition 
in Latin America not because they were incompletely drafted; but rather because the political system 
did not function to protect them. And they were sometimes ignored in the United States, especially 
on racial matters, not because they failed to be well-articulated, but rather because there was no 
consensual will to pay full heed to them and, correspondingly, because politicians gained little 
political capital by acting otherwise. 
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What is evident from this abbreviated answer to our question, then, is that the mechanism whereby 
rights are protected and the public interest served depends on a complex interaction of all parts of 
the government, in combination with the people's consensual determination to keep those rights. It 
follows that, when evaluating some part of a constitution, we must calculate how that part fits into 
the larger scheme of things. Thus, a debate over the appropriate relationship of the executive to the 
legislature cannot be resolved without also considering, among other things, the federal construction 
of the state, the likely character of political parties, and the relationship of each branch of 
government to voters. Similarly, in ascertaining whether a constitution grants local or regional 
government sufficient autonomy requires that we evaluate the extent to which the -parts ·of the 
national government have an incentive to maintain that autonomy, which depends on whether national 
politicians will be led to care sufficiently about local interests, which depends on whether people 
prefer to defend regional interests and regional governmental prerogatives against incursions by the 
national government, which, completing the circle, depends on whether the state as a whole is 
structured so as to encourage that interest among its citizens. 
We must, of course, begin somewhere when learning how the parts of a democratic state fit 
together -- especially in so heterogeneous a country as Russia with its critical economic problems. 
Thus, we will turn in our next essay to the matter of federalism and the relationship of the component 
parts of the country to the federation itself. More specifically, we will turn next to examine the 
essential purpose of the federal state, the role political parties play in preserving that purpose, and 
the determinants of that role. 
3. Federalism: Ingredient for Stability or Recipe for Dissolution?
Certainly Russia's most pressing political needs are finding a solution to internal ethnic conflicts, 
developing incentives for her parts to remain within the Russian Federation, and constructing a state 
that efficiently solves and avoids crises. There are three commonly discussed paths to this end. The 
first and for some the preferred one, is force applied by a resurrected authoritarian state. But 
Russians have other goals in addition to living in a stable and prosperous state. They also demand a 
state that preserves and protects their individual rights and liberties. In addition, we must also 
understand that any move in the direction of renewed authoritarianism would produce a reaction 
around the world that will not only damage Russia's attractiveness as an arena for foreign investment 
but that will also resurrect images of the Cold War. And it is the blind fool who does not appreciate 
that, regardless of one's sympathies, the West can better afford to engage in that war than can Russia. 
Hence, before any coercive route is chosen and before Russia once again travels the path favored by 
fascists of both the right and the left, it is only prudent to explore the remaining two paths - - a 
centralized democratic state and democratic federalism. 
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We appreciate that a deteriorating economy has led people to believe that democracy merely 
exacerbates problems and cannot solve much of anything. We also understand the fear that a 
democratic federalism in particular which maximizes the political and economic autonomy of the 
individual, of local governments, and of regional and republic governments is little more than a recipe 
for the dissolution of the Russian state. Thus, there appears to be reasonable arguments for preferring 
if not an authoritarian state, a state that is a limited democratic one that places power predominantly 
in the hands of a national government, and that, while giving local authorities some autonomy, 
negotiates the preponderance of regional and local prerogatives on a case-by-case (treaty) basis. 
But these arguments are incomplete because a true democratic federalism has not -yet been 
explored in Russia and because current proposals for the construction of a federal state fall far short 
of an optimal design. Democracy is something other than occasional voting for national officials. 
And an efficient and stable federalism must be something other than the geographical division of the 
country into distinct governmental units that operate with some "top-down" line of authority, 
augmented by bilaterally negotiated agreements between a central authority and regional governments. 
Those who would seek to direct Russia's destiny must unlearn the instinct to centralize and 
nationalize. Russia's brains and genius are not contained in the heads and hearts of a handful of 
political elites. They exist everywhere and in abundant supply and it should not be the case that her 
people must first find access to the corridors of power in Moscow before they can make their 
contribution. 
Of course, the option of a true federalism should be preferred to other alternatives only if it can 
be described in terms of specifics that promise a reasonable chance of success. And although nothing 
in this domain comes with a guarantee, if there is any hope that it might yield a solution (or at least 
reduce the need for force), it ought to be explored before dangerous demagogues are given the stage. 
This essay, then, seeks to identify these specifics. 
We should state at the outset, though, that federalism can be understood only if we divide our 
discussion into two parts - - the formal, constitutional structure of the federal state and the "informal" 
extra-constitutional structures (especially political parties) that arise to organize and direct political 
action in such a state. This essay focuses on constitutional structures; our next will examine the role 
of political parties and the special part they play in ensuring a political system's stability. Only by 
thus dividing our subject can we hope to convince the reader that it is possible to craft a democratic 
federalism in which Russia's parts would seek unity out of self-interest and in which individual rights 
would be guaranteed as a matter of course. 
Turning, then, to constitutional matters, let us evaluate the assumption that the fragility of the 
Russian Federation derives from her current economic problems. With a national economy in free­
fall, with government deficits funded by fast-running printing presses churning out ever larger 
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denominations of rubles, each part of society, each region, republic, and district seeks to capture 
control of the resources and industry within its territory. Such are the explanations for the USSR's 
dissolution and for the problems the CIS encounters with becoming a meaningful entity. Adding to 
the danger, the argument continues, are privatization schemes that threaten massive redistribution so 
that each part of society competes against all other parts to retain control of what it has while 
demanding a share in everything else. 
But economics can provide only a partial explanation of the centripetal forces operating today. 
The depression of the l 930's impacted everyone yet only a few states experienced revolutionary 
political change. And the forces operating today against the stability of, say, Canada cannot be 
described as the consequences of severe economic dislocation -- Russians would love to have Canada's 
economic "problems." This is not to say that economic prosperity would not weaken many of the 
demands for independence and sovereignty or that believable promises of a mutually profitable 
society would not put a brake on extremist views. But given the interdependence of economies and 
subsequent consequences, few could argue that the dissolution of the USSR was collectively 
economically rational. Individual rationality, especially that of national leaders who sought to 
consolidate their power, overcame any imperative formed by collective rationality calculated purely 
on the basis of economics. 
Thus, short of an unacceptable tyranny, disputes and competition between regional and national 
governments, as well as among regional governments, are ubiquitous and eternal. No one prefers to 
be taxed by a distant government, regardless of economic circumstances; everyone prefers unfettered 
control of whatever it is that they possess or hope to possess; national governments and their officials 
will always prefer to increase their power; and regional authorities will always resist the supremacy 
of the national officials while at the same time seeking advantage whenever possible over other 
regions. The American Civil War did not end the dispute between state and national governments or 
between north and south -- it merely removed the issue of slavery from the agenda of conflict. 
Switzerland's federal form has not produced a state in which cantons do not compete against the 
national government for supremacy. And members of the European Economic Community continue 
to struggle against the interest of the Community as a whole and against each other. 
So if we cannot eliminate conflict, how do we control its effects -- how do we design governments 
that mute regional conflicts that threaten dissolution? If we view the national government as a referee 
that coordinates regional governments, moderates competition among them, and does those things that 
are best centralized (e.g., foreign policy, controlling the money supply, maintaining free trade within 
its geographic domain), then how, in giving the national government authority to act, do we avoid 
constructing a thing that either destroys regional autonomy by usurping power for its own ends or that 
facilitates the actions of a subset of regional governments that seek dominance over others? 
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The answer to this question leads away from constructing a centralized democracy and leads 
instead in the direction of a federalism that is unlike the one that currently characterizes Russia. It 
tells us not to construct a federalism in which certain regions, owing to their ethnic composition, bear 
a different relation to the national government than do other parts of the country; not to construct 
a federalism in which various parts of the country are autonomous and yet other parts are mere 
appendages of the national government; and not to construct a "federalism" in which we maintain the 
old Soviet command-and-control philosophy of assuming that people in Moscow know best and that 
only their policies can lead Russia back from the economic abyss. 
A particular problem with current form of the Russian Federation, but which is both endemic to 
a centralized federal government and which renders such a state especially susceptible to instability, 
is the unequal relations of the different parts of the state to the national government. A federal 
system that is not symmetric -- a system in which degrees of autonomy vary from one region to 
another and in which a confusing array of bilateral and multilateral treaties characterize the state's 
organization -- is simply untenable and can be held together only by force and with authoritarian 
control. Just as one person's greater relative prosperity creates envy among his neighbors, one region's 
greater autonomy merely establishes the legitimacy of demands for greater autonomy on the part of 
other regions. In the asymmetric federalism, regions compete for special favors, for particular 
dispensations from central control, and for recognition of their "unique circumstances." And it is the 
escalation of these demands -- demands brought about by the general inequality of condition -- that 
are the chief threat to the stability of any federal state. 
Any asymmetry of autonomy, moreover, must be accompanied by an asymmetry in individual 
rights. A person living in a region without local control of local policy simply does not have the same 
rights as a person living in a region with such control. A person living in a place in which public 
officials are appointed by authorities in Moscow is living in a less democratically free state than is 
a person living in a region that elects its own officials and chooses its own forms of local governance. 
And as with regions, so it is with people -- envy and the competition for autonomy and rights are the 
logical consequence of inequality. 
This envy and competition, which can arise from accidental historical processes as well as from 
conscious design, is especially destabilizing in the centralized democratic state, since the only source 
of reform lies at the locus of political power -- the national government. But this process merely 
requires that that national government be involved continuously in the allocation of differential 
benefits across its sub-parts, with the inevitable result that some sub-parts will seek to win control 
of the national government and use its power for their own ends. In the decentralized and symmetric 
democratic federalism, on the other hand, no such concentration of power exists and, therefore, there 
is not authority that can exacerbate whatever inequalities might accidentally arise. 
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So the first rule in constructing a stable democratic state requires that we firmly adhere to the 
principle of equality among that state's constituent parts. No republic, oblast, or kray should have 
any more or less autonomy than any other part. No region should be singled out as having 
characteristics that justify making its residents any less or more democratically free than people 
elsewhere. 
A second rule is partially implied by our arguments for the first -- specifically, in constructing 
a democratic federalism, the autonomy of all republics, oblasts, and krays should be maximized so 
that we reserve for the national government only those functions that it alone can perform (for 
example, maintenance of a national defense, maintenance of a stable currency, guaranteeing"the free 
flow of goods, services and people across the different parts of the republic, and the establishment 
of a court system that provides for equal treatment before the law for all citizens). 
This second rule is supported by two arguments. The first is the simple empirical fact that people 
learn to be democratic, to value the rights of others, and to organize to press their political demands 
upon the state by first learning how to organize and participate in local and regional politics. People 
will pay only slight attention to those things they cannot directly influence and that influence them 
only indirectly. And they will be most cynical about and hostile to those things that seem beyond 
their ability to influence. Local and regional matters should be otherwise; indeed, local and regional 
politics should be the great classroom of democratic ideas and values. 
Democratic values are not learned by the exhortations of political and intellectual elites to the 
people to be democratic. They are learned by the practical experience that participation in local and 
regional politics provides. But this classroom cannot exist if local and regional governments have little 
control over those things that affect them and that do not affect other regions. It cannot exist if 
Moscow insists on appointing regional governors; it cannot exist if Moscow insists on directing the 
design of local and regional governments (aside from ensuring that they are democratic); it cannot 
exist if Moscow insists on deciding everything from speed limits on local streets, to the textbooks that 
will be used in local schools, to the methods whereby local and regional officials are elected to office. 
These are the things that must e decided by people who are perfectly capable of making their own 
judgements about the things that most concern them. 
The other supporting our second rule is that local conflicts which arise within a political sub-unit 
are less likely disrupt national politics in a decentralized system than in a centralized one. All 
conflicts in the centralized state must be resolved by central authorities because only they, by 
definition, have the power to act. A decentralized federalism, in contrast, allows people to search 
first for local solutions, if only because doing so maintains their autonomy. Only when mutually 
satisfactory compromises cannot be achieved will the national government be called into the conflict 
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to umpire a resolution. And the fewer conflicts that a moved up to the national level, the fewer 
conflicts there are to threaten the state's ultimate stability. 
This last argument leads to a third rule that supports a decentralized federalism over a centralized 
one. As succinctly stated by Thomas Jefferson, "the government that governs best is the government 
that governs least." This rule is not a call for anarchy; instead, it merely seeks to recognize the simple 
principle of social organization that the most efficient form of government is one that seeks to 
devolve as much power and authority as possible to lower levels of government. National 
governments that try to "do it all" not only undermine the educational function of regional and local 
governments, but they necessarily introduce inefficiencies into the operation of the state. In 
accordance with processes that Russia knows well, the dead hand of bureaucratic centralization leads 
to bureaucratic insensitivities to local and regional needs. This dead hand stifles innovation and 
experimentation with different policies and the discovery of better policies. And this dead hand 
eliminates any incentives on the part of local and regional authorities to take responsibility for their 
actions, thereby undermining the relationship between citizens and their government. 
Of course, what we have said thus far may seem like mere utopianism, if only because we have 
not responded to the rhetorical question: What keeps a decentralized federalism decentralized yet 
whole? What keeps the national government in a decentralized federalism from eventually usurping 
power? What keeps regional governments from coalescing against each other? And what ensures that 
we are not merely encouraging the ultimate dissolution of the state by deliberate decentralization? 
The responses to these questions requires that we consider things other than mere constitutional 
guarantees and structures. We must also look at the form and operation of those organizations that 
people establish to influence political outcomes - - political parties. The role of parties in a federal 
state, then, becomes the subject of our next essay. 
4. Political Parties: A Source of Faction or Agents of Political Stability?
In our last essay we argued that Russia requires not only a decentralized federalism that grants as
much autonomy to its sub-parts as possible, but also a symmetric one that treats all of those parts 
equally. However, we ended that essay with a series of unanswered questions that left our argument 
incomplete. Specifically, we asked: What keeps a decentralized federalism decentralized and yet 
whole? What keeps the national government in a decentralized federalism from eventually usurping 
power? What keeps regional governments from coalescing against each other? And what ensures that 
we are not merely encouraging the ultimate dissolution of the state by deliberate decentralization? 
Until and unless we can answer these questions we remain vulnerable to the argument that a true 
federalism is little more than a recipe for Russia's ultimate demise. 
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The particular problem with constructing a true federal state is that the constitutional restrictions 
that we might place on the national government in defining and limiting its authority are, as much 
as any other type of constitutional prohibition, subject to reinterpretation and manipulation as a 
consequence of the political forces that constitution creates. Granting regional governments control 
over some resource, for example, does not stop the national government from seeking to circumvent 
the restrictions placed on it by taxing any gains from the efficient use of those resources or from 
otherwise indirectly exerting control through regulation. 
Guarding against such possibilities with additional guarantees merely makes a constitution 
unwieldy and unenforceable. But perhaps even .more problematical in Russia's case is the· fact that 
negotiating the precise terms of autonomy -- deciding within the context of a constitution which 
matters fall under the jurisdiction of the national government and which belong to regional or district 
governments -- will be a protracted and contentious process that will itself exacerbate the forces for 
dissolution. As the conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada illustrates, such negotiations can 
set region against region as each claims special privilege or fears that such privilege will be given to 
others. And as the domestic processes of all federalisms show, the process of negotiating the terms 
of autonomy are continuous and unending, and, therefore, such negotiations remain a constant 
potential source of political instability. 
We hasten to add that these concerns are not, of themselves, arguments against seeking a 
constitutionally constructed decentralized federalism. After all, this approach is credited with being 
Switzerland's source of stability in the face of well-defined linguistic cleavages. But Switzerland does 
not have Russia's global interests and it has sustained itself through much of its history by the fact 
of being surrounded by far more powerful adversaries. Russia has global interests, it is the home of 
innumerable numbers of small yet important ethnic groups and nationalities, and the assumption of 
the eternal existence of powerful enemies is a weak basis on which to plan for domestic stability 
(although a convenient basis on which the demagogue rests his inflammatory demands to lead). 
Moreover, abiding by the Swiss design cannot resolve Russia's special problem of having to find a 
way to negotiate the multiple and varied demands of autonomy without the act of negotiation itself 
inciting crisis. 
So even if we accept the idea that meaningful grants of regional autonomy are an essential part 
of a stable democratic state, we should ask whether there are ways to negotiate these grants without 
threatening dissolution and whether they can be designed to resist the constant forces acting to 
undermine any explicit plan of decentralization and fairness. 
At this point we must resist the temptation to appeal to purely constitutional structures for any 
guarantee that the system we design will remain in place. We cannot keep trying to elaborate 
guarantees of regional autonomy, for example, because doing so merely avoids the problem of 
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determining how the last added clause, prohibition, or requirement is to be enforced. At some point, 
the terms of federation set forth in a constitution must be self-enforcing, and this fact tells us that 
we must look to those extra-constitutional processes and entities that, although perhaps created by 
a constitution's construction, either act to undermine or to reenforce that document. 
Of all the extra-constitutional things that emerge in a democracy perhaps none is more important 
that the political party. Until we describe and understand the role of parties in whatever system we 
set in place, we cannot predict how that system will ultimately function and whether it will in fact 
yield a stable political system. Political parties in a democracy are not, as they are currently in 
Russia, personal factions or social clubs designed to express one ideological position or another as 
loudly as possible. Parties in a democracy are the organizations politicians use to get elected -- the 
things they use to mobilize voters, to communicate their issue positions, to raise campaign funds, and 
to organize legislative coalitions. But just as politicians and political structure influence the form and 
role of parties in a democracy, parties influence the actions of politicians. Either directly or 
indirectly, they influence the incentives of political candidates to negotiate compromises before they 
run under the same party label, they determine which issues become salient in a national election 
campaign and which ones remain isolated at the local level. And their structure, determined by 
electoral laws and the other institutional components of a political system, help determine the extent 
to which these electoral laws in fact give voters the opportunity to control their elected 
representatives. 
To see what we mean by all of this and to see how parties contribute to a political system's 
stability, it is useful to see what lessons the American example might provide. Some people might 
object to the relevance of America, given its different traditions and economic circumstances, and 
given its absence of territorial ethnic groups. However, America is not only today a stable federalism, 
it is also one that experienced Civil War in the last century, and the sources of its stability and 
instability are instructive. In particular, America offers some important lessons about how some 
constitutional provisions in addition to those we discussed in our earlier essay facilitate political 
stability, but that, unless we look at the structure of America's political parties, might otherwise go 
largely unappreciated. 
The central point of our argument is that we can trace the stability of America's federal system 
to the structure of its two major parties, the form of which derives from the influence of four 
important elements of its constitution. The first element is the requirement that national legislators 
-- members of the House of Representatives and the Senate -- be residents of their constituencies. 
The second is the flexibility it gives to state governments (which have the right to design republican 
governments to their own liking) to prescribe the manner of election of national representatives 
(subject to the condition that those procedures be "democratic"). The third element concerns what 
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in not in the constitution -- namely, any device (such as the authority to dissolve the legislature) that 
allows the president to control legislative parties or even the party he nominally heads. The final 
element is the manner in which the president is elected, which requires broad based national support 
that transcends regional appeals. 
These four things take us a long way in explaining the most evident feature of America's national 
parties, namely that they are highly decentralized creatures, that are organized at the state and local 
level and that compete with seemingly obscure non-ideological platforms. America does not have two 
national parties -- it has fifty Republican and fifty Democratic state parties that act every four years 
to nominate and elect a president but that function continuously to compete. at the •State and local 
level. Hence, national legislators are elected according to rules set by their states (including the 
geographic definition of their districts) and as part of campaign run by state party organizations. 
Consequently, these legislators, even if they seek national office or otherwise aspire to national and 
international visibility, cannot ignore local needs. And with a president who can influence their 
electoral destinies only slightly, that office provides only the weakest incentive to form strong 
national party organizations (even Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempts to influence congressional 
elections are legendary). These facts mean then that the national legislature remains protective of 
local and regional concerns. 
But these facts do not explain why legislative coalitions do not form on the basis of purely regional 
concerns. This possibility is guarded against by the importance otherwise of the presidency so that 
the rewards of securing it provide the incentive for state parties to coalesce across states. That only 
two such coalitions form (as opposed to many in the parliamentary systems of Europe) follows from 
the constitutionally mandated laws under which presidential elections are conducted and from the fact 
that the American president is anything by a weak public figure. Without examining details, the 
"winner-take-all" character of those laws and the limited opportunities they provide for minor parties 
(even those that receive 20% of the vote as in Ross Perot's case) to block the selection of a winner 
compels politicians to coalesce into two blocks -- Democrat and Republican. And insofar as regional 
coalitions are concerned, those laws also make it difficult for a party to succeed if its support is 
geographically restricted. Thus, in a wholly automatic way, parties seeking to win the presidency 
must be national. 
Local concerns, though, remain predominant within parties, so both parties are compelled by the 
forces of competition to negotiate their internal geographic contradictions before they disrupt national 
politics. Indeed, the single instance in which geographic conflict was negotiated semi-constitutionally 
outside of party structures resulted in civil war. The American Civil War occurred when politicians 
short-circuited the natural process of intra-party compromise and upset a delicate constitutional 
balance of powers by artificially maintaining a Senatorial representation of southern slave states equal 
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to that of the north. Because this arrangement could not be sustained on both moral and practical 
grounds (the practical matter being the predominance of northern industrial development), it led to 
a split of one of the national parties and, subsequently, to a war between north and south. 
Thus, the primary guarantor of American federalism against regional conflict and of the autonomy 
of state governments is not prosperity (which may be more the consequence of stability as its cause) 
or explicit constitutional provisions of autonomy (although they obviously cannot hurt if consensually 
agreed to). Instead, it is a consequence of a delicate constitutional balance formed by a complex 
combination provisions that decentralize party structures and yet at the same time compel them to 
negotiate their internal contradictions. 
These devices may have been arrived at as much by accident as by planning (the framers of the 
American constitution failed to appreciate fully the role parties would play in their future). And we 
certainly have not attempted to dissuade anyone yet from thinking that the Russia's internal conflicts 
are more divisive still than those that confronted America in the l 850's. But the operation of these 
devices provides important general lessons for those who would design a new Russia federalism. We 
must appreciate that political parties can unify as well as divide and that constitutional structures 
ought to be designed with this fact in mind. We should not look to any single clause or provision to 
accomplish our goal of stability -- party structures and roles are determined by the interplay of many 
constitutional devices. Looking at a single relationship such the relative powers of president versus 
legislature will lead to unanticipated consequences. As with any self -controlling mechanism, we 
should pay special attention to how the influence of each element of a federalism interacts with and 
is influenced by all of the other political parts of the nation. 
Of course, there are many things that distinguish America from Russia that must be taken into 
account when attempting to apply these lessons. Most important is the fundamental difference in the 
composition of ethnic group demands in Russia and America. Owing to the structure of its economy, 
it history, and such matters as housing shortages, there is considerably less geographic mobility within 
Russia and a good deal more territorial conflict. Combined with an economic deterioration that 
precludes an explicit or implicit process of "buying off" these demand, circumstances in Russia often 
seem to make compromise seem unrealizable. It is this issue to which we will turn in our next essay. 
A second potential difference, depending on the final resolution of the conflict between the 
People's Congress and President Yeltsin, concerns Russia's choice of a strong parliamentary or strong 
presidential system. Much of what we have said about America would not hold were it not the case 
that her regional parties have a strong incentive to coalesce in order to win the presidency. Without 
this incentive, we could expect to see a great many regional parties forming and surviving, leaving 
inter-regional compromises being formed, if they can be formed at all, wholly within the legislature. 
This fact alone means that the issue of a strong versus a weak presidency for Russia cannot be 
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divorced from plans to ensure that Russia's federal structure remains in place and that inter-ethnic 
compromise be encouraged. Until and unless proponents of a governmental form that emphasizes the 
power of parliament over that of a president can tell us how their federal structure will survive, we 
should remain prejudiced toward the establishment of a strong president -- at least a president 
capable of vetoing legislation and who can direct the operation of the executive branch of government 
-- including the selection and dismissal of cabinet personnel -- without undue interference from the 
legislature. Put simply, no document can be approved as a constitution for Russia until we understand 
fully how it inhibits or prohibits a stable federalism. 
5.  Parliamentary versus Presidential Government in an Ethnically Divided State 
In our last essay we argued that a political system with a few (two or three) parties that have 
regionally decentralized structures can greatly facilitate political compromise and mute conflicts 
between and among national and regional governments. However, hat argument was based on the 
American experience, which many people believe is irrelevant to Russia. Aside from differences in 
history and current circumstances, Russia, unlike America, has any number of contentious territorial 
ethnic groups, some of which profess to prefer autonomy or independence and others with territorial 
claims on yet other minorities within the Federation. Such conflicts, especially when reenforced by 
religious or linguistic cleavages, have an emotional component that can preclude any resolution, short 
of the application of coercion by a central authority. At the a minimum, then, we should consider 
as broad a range of democratic options as possible in looking for ways to minimize the impact of these 
conflicts. 
We begin by noting that although all draft constitutions prepared for Russia provide for a 
president in some form, Moscow's rancorous political debates offer proposals that drag things in the 
direction of parliamentary government and proposals that point in the direction of the American 
model. The first thing - - which is championed Yeltsin's opponents, which is the logical outgrowth 
of Soviet constitutions, and which is part of the draft document prepared by the Constitutional 
Commission headed by Oleg Rumyantsev (and included as well as the version prepared by Anatoli 
Sobchak) -- allows Congress to control the Council of Ministers through its power to dismiss the 
Council. Yeltsin's supporters, on the other hand, demand that the president have the right to dissolve 
Congress and call for new elections. Adding this power to current constitutional drafts yields a mixed 
system that parallels France's presidential-parliamentary structure. A third possibility emerges if 
drop both proposals from the constitution, in which case we arrive at a system in the American 
presidential mold. 
The debate over these alternatives occurs largely in the context of the power struggle between 
Yeltsin and the Congress. But the choice of governmental form should be divorced from such power 
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struggles and should focus instead on the issue of the ultimate stability of the Russian state. Looking 
first, then, at parliamentary systems, the key feature of such systems is that they provide for a unitary 
government in which the chief executive (prime minister) and his cabinet serve at the discretion of 
the legislature - - or, more precisely, at the discretion of a majority in the legislature. As long as the 
government can ensure a majority in the legislature, it performs its executive functions, including 
leadership in the formulation and execution of the law. But if a legislative majority cannot be 
sustained, the government resigns or the prime minister calls for new elections. Although a number 
of variations can be found around the world, a president plays a minor role in parliamentary 
government so that executive-legislative conflict is minimized by making the executive a part of the 
legislature. 
By thus avoiding such conflict, the argument goes, Russia can better pursue a rational policy of 
economic and social reform. However, parliamentary systems have their drawbacks. The first, which 
arises if the party system is highly fractionalized, is that legislative coalitions and thus, the 
government itself, may be unstable. This instability, which is especially prevalent in political systems 
without established party structures or with structures that allow extremist parties to be pivotal in the 
formation of governing coalitions, can be as threatening to rational economic planning as executive­
legislative deadlock. The second danger is the tyranny that simple majority rule in a legislature 
allows. Such tyranny may take a mild form in a state with major parties that do not differ much on 
issues or in states without deep conflicts. But it can be quite real in states in which minorities are 
systematically excluded from governmental coalitions owing to their small size or extremist views. 
The efficiency and stability of parliamentary systems, then, depends on the character of the 
political parties that emerge to compete for parliamentary seats. And that character, in turn, depends 
on the extent to which we try to satisfy another demand that commonly arises in ethnically divided 
societies -- the demand for proportional legislative representation (PR). Fearing that they will be 
under-represented if simple majority rule procedures are used to elect legislators (especially if they 
fear that legislative districts can be drawn to render them minorities in all districts), and realizing that 
legislative representation in some form is the only way to influence a government, minorities will 
demand some guarantee of representation. PR is the usual route to that end. 
Interestingly, the Rumyantsev draft appears to encourage or at least leaves the door open to PR 
to the extent that it requires only that, in a direct vote, "The State Duma consists of 450 deputies 
elected ...  by territorial constituency proportionate to the size of the electorate therein" [Article 84, 
section 2] (the Sobchak draft is more elliptical and it is difficult to see precisely what mode of 
representation is intended). Such a clause seems to encourage PR since the most common way to 
achieve PR is to hold elections in large districts of varied size, depending on population, that 
simultaneously elect as many as twenty representatives (or, as in Israel and Holland, the whole 
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legislature in one national district). Parties submit lists of candidates, voters vote for the party they 
prefer, and the parties are allocated seats in the district in proportion to the votes they receive there. 
Because securing a majority or a plurality is no longer required to win a parliamentary seat, various 
parties emerge to represent the specific ideological, ethnic, social, or religious cleavages that 
characterize society, where the actual number of parties depends on the number and salience of pre­
existing cleavages and other details of electoral procedures (such as the actual size of districts, 
minimum vote requirements, and alternative ways of tabulating votes). 
PR, then, seems an attractive addition to parliamentary government since it gives groups within 
society the opportunity for explicit representation. But PR has its disadvantages. First, it increase 
the incentives of politicians to engineer the creation of cleavages or to increase the salience of 
preexisting ones, as when someone engineers conflict in order to use it as a basis for forming and 
leading a new parliamentary party. Put simply, PR gives extremist an audience and a potential role 
in the formation of a government. Moreover, although forming a government creates some incentive 
for compromise, these incentives are greatly reduced to the extent that electoral rules fail to 
discourage the formation of parties, since parties will then strive to differentiate themselves from 
each other in order to maintain their electoral support. Little compromise occurs within party 
structures since a party without a clear focus will soon find itself prey to those competitive parties -
- both moderate and extreme -- that provide such a focus. 
Admittedly, these problems need not be consequential in a homogeneous society. But a pure 
parliamentary system that employs PR seems wholly inappropriate for Russia since Russia requires 
less not more fragmentation in parties and less not more reasons for increasing the salience of ethnic 
disputes. More problematical still is the fact that none of the current draft constitutions specify how 
legislative districts will be drawn or who will do the drawing. Hence, there is no reason to suppose 
that PR will not operate to fragment parties further or will not operate wholly to the benefit of some 
majority within the legislature. 
We turn, then, to the opposite extreme, presidential government, which is characterized by an 
elected chief of state who heads a government that he appoints (with the "consent of the legislature") 
and that only he can dismiss. The presumed advantage of this system, of course, is that a popularly 
elected president provides a country with a focus for its aspirations and its sense of nationhood. It 
also provides for the election of a person who can lead in times of emergency. Thus, we are not 
surprised when states strengthen this office (for example, France in the !950's) if confronted with 
seemingly intractable problems. Presidential systems also guarantee a greater degree of political 
stability since, unlike parliamentary systems, the government (president) is elected for a fixed, 
constitutionally mandated term. 
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There are, nevertheless, at least two problems commonly associated with this alternative. The 
first, and the one that parliamentary systems seek to avoid, is the possibility of legislative-executive 
stalemate, which arises whenever the president's party is different from the one that controls the 
legislature (to imagine a president who can forever "remain above party and politics" is naive). Hence, 
choosing between presidential and parliamentary systems can be a choice between an efficient unitary 
state with the potential for instability versus legislative deadlock but with stability. 
The second problem associated with presidential systems is that there does not appear to be any 
"best" way to elect a president - - all electoral procedures come with both desirable and undesirable 
features. Minority demands for PR are reduced in presidential systems owing largely to the 
diminished importance of the legislature. In fact, the more important matter is the method of electing 
a president since with a strong presidential system, it is this method that determines party structures. 
Of course, a direct vote seems the simplest and most "democratic" method. But there are many 
ways to conduct such a vote (inexplicably, the Rumyantsev draft leaves this matter up to the 
legislature -- a feature that must be corrected). One possibility is to require that a victorious 
candidate receive a majority of votes and to allow for a runoff election between the two strongest 
candidates if no one receives a majority on the first ballot. The majority requirement with a runoff 
seeks to ensure against the election of a candidate who receives only 30% of the vote and who is 
opposed strongly by a majority. Like PR, though, this system rewards minor parties that form merely 
to block a first-ballot victory so they can negotiate to throw their support to one candidate or another. 
Thus, the majority runoff procedure (employed in the Sobchak draft constitution) eliminates one of 
the great advantages of presidentialism - - namely, the incentive of parties to coalesce and to compete 
across ethnic categories for the office of president. 
The difficulties with a direct vote are compounded by the inexplicable requirement in the 
"Sobchak constitution" that turnout exceed 50% before an election is deemed valid. One of the great 
fallacies of democracy is the belief that low turnout is "bad" and high turnout is "good." Voters may 
abstain because they are dissatisfied and repulsed by all alternatives; on the other hand, they may also 
abstain because all viable candidates are acceptable. And formal turnout requirement merely sets the 
stage for extremist parties to call for election boycotts, without requiring that they formulate explicit 
policy alternatives. 
Many of the defects of a direct vote can be corrected if the minimum turnout requirement is 
deleted and if, instead of a majority, we require that the winning candidate receive some lesser 
percentage of the vote (say 40%) before mandating a runoff. But before we think that this 
modification solves all problems, consider the problem of attempting to ensure against the possibility 
of a "regional president" -- a president who secures most of his electoral support from a specific 
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(albeit large) geographical region and whose election thereby threatens those regions who failed to 
provide him with any significant support. 
One alternative is to eschew a single president, and, as in Switzerland (and Yugoslavia before its 
dissolution), to employ a collegial presidency in which a president is selected on a rotating basis from 
a committee composed of representatives of its larger cantons, or in which the president is the 
committee itself. As Simon Bolivar argued over a century and a half ago, though, such a system lacks 
"unity, continuity, and individual responsibility." Nigeria, in its 1979 constitution, took a different 
approach and required that presidents secure at least 25% of the votes in each of its nineteen states. 
Czechoslovakia, prior to its dissolution, required thatjts president secure a majority in both its Czech 
and Slovak halves. However, such systems can result in contentious bargaining whenever no one 
meets these requirements. They also create incentives for the formation of regional ethnic parties that 
seek to block the election of anyone so that they can bargain subsequently for special advantages. 
The American model offers a different approach that may be especially relevant to Russia owing 
to its federal character. Because it awards a state's voting weight (which is determined essentially by 
its share of the country's population), and because a president must win a majority of "state votes," 
this system greatly disadvantages candidates who can make only regional appeals. Once a candidate 
has a plurality in any particular state, increases his vote further there does not increase his likelihood 
of winning since it cannot increase his "state vote." Thus, a candidate cannot win the presidency 
merely by securing an overwhelming vote in some special region of the country. We might speculate, 
in fact, that some of the pressures for Czechoslovakia's dissolution might have dissipated if, instead 
of a two-district scheme, it had divided itself into a greater number of districts (allowing some of 
them to be ethnically heterogeneous so as to "train" the parties to compete across ethnic categories 
rather than wholly within them). The disadvantage of this scheme, though, is that, until a two-party 
system forms so that one party is assured of securing a plurality in a majority of districts (states), 
elections are likely to be decided by the legislature, as occurred in the United States on several 
occasions in the early 1 9th century. 
There are other possibilities, including wholly indirect devices in which voters elect "electors," who 
select a president. Or, we can combine presidential and parliamentary systems as in France, although 
this can result in the anachronistic situation in which a strong president must contend with a 
government controlled by and opposition party. There is, though, no need to explore additional 
possibilities, since we are in a position to offer some definitive conclusions. First, to reiterate a point 
made in a previous essay, the character of a political system is determined not by any single factor 
such as the relative power of the president versus the legislature. It is a function of, among other 
things, the electoral procedures used to elect legislators and presidents. Second, no system is perfect. 
The choice between a presidential and a parliamentary system entails a number of choices between 
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hypothetical consequences -- a unified government versus executive-legislative deadlock or between 
governmental stability and instability. Third, no electoral system is perfect or offers a guarantee of 
stability. Proportional representation promises minorities a formal voice; but it can result an a highly 
fractionalized party structure incapable of achieving compromise on divisive issues. A direct vote 
for president can do the same thing; and a direct vote need not preclude the possibility of wholly 
regional candidates. Other mechanisms can avoid these problems, but only by admitting the 
possibility of indecisive outcomes and the necessity for legislative selection. 
Of course, none of these difficulties is an argument for not making any choice. People and 
political systems will adapt to different constitutions, and it is more important to choose some system 
and some constitution rather than search for a non-existent perfection, if only so that everyone is 
clear about the rules of legitimate political process and so that the people of Russia can get on with 
their business. 
6. Democratic Institutions: Why Would They Influence Anything?
The theme of our first four essays is that the design of democratic institutions - - of constitutions,
electoral laws, forms of legislative representation, and so on - - can greatly influence outcomes, 
including the stability of the state itself. But why should we believe that institutions will influence 
anything of consequence? Aren't there fundamental forces and historical inevitabilities that 
determine the flow of events? Why should we suppose that these institutions will not merely provide 
legal cover for the few who act to the detriment of the many? And, more specifically, why should 
we expect that importing institutions that seem alien to Russian political tradition and alien to the 
social theories of the past seven decades can change the future course of Russian politics in any 
appreciable way? 
These are profoundly important questions because they take us to the root source of democratic 
stability and to the basis for asserting that democratic process has legitimacy as a preferred form of 
social organization. Thus, they warrant answers before we proceed further in this series to discussions 
of alternative institutional forms and democratic processes. 
We begin with the fact that every society operates by rules that define admissible and 
inadmissible, cultured and uncultured, encouraged and discouraged behavior. In primitive societies, 
these rules often appear as tradition and religious proscription. More modern societies set some of 
its rules to paper as laws, but most rules remain implicit and are referred to as "social norms." A norm 
may be a simple thing such as allowing those on a bus to exit before those who wish to enter move; 
or it may be more complex as when it proscribes whom to give one's seat to on a bus and when to do 
it. Simple or complex, these norms guide behavior on a day-to-day basis and it is difficult to imagine 
society without them. 
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But why do people allow themselves to be bound by norms, especially if, as is usually the case, 
there are no laws to ensure their enforcement? The short answer to this question is that society, 
implicitly aware of the order they provide and the benefits that flow from order, achieves a consensus 
about acceptable patterns of behavior and teaches them to successive generations so that they become 
"instinctual." At the same time, of course, society remains prepared to sanction those who defect from 
its norms, and so it must also establish norms that govern the application of these sanctions. For 
example, shoving one's way onto a bus before all who wish to leave it have done so may ensure a seat, 
but most persons avoid such behavior because they know what everyone thinks of such acts -- and 
few persons want even strangers to think poorly of them or prefer to be scolded !Jublicly·by someone's 
grandmother. Norms of acceptable conduct on public transportation are adhered to, then, because 
it is not in a person's self-interest to act otherwise. And the norm is enforced because those who do 
so -- the grandmother who scolds -- knows that her actions are effective and socially acceptable. 
Conversely, social norms stop serving their purpose when people come to believe that others will 
not adhere to them, when people fail to impose the requisite sanctions, or when people become 
confused over which norms are legitimate and which are illegitimate. Society in general and Russia 
in particular, then, can encounter 11a crisis of norms11 when it tries to establish new social and 
economic relations and at the same time disrupts any consensus over acceptable rules of social action. 
If we are told in one month that private profit is a crime and in the next that it is a social virtue or 
that the accumulation of private property has been transformed from an act of exploitation to a right, 
then it may take some time before a new system of social norms emerges to render society coherent 
and efficient. 
Most norms come to us "automatically" and unable to comprehend their source, we relegate their 
study to anthropologists. But there is another set of norms that are established, if they are established 
at all, in a different way -- the norms of democracy. These norms, which include such things as 
honoring the civil liberties and constraints on action provided for in a constitution, arise at least 
initially through acts of conscious creation. In fact, the most explicit and expansive act of norm­
creation is drafting a political constitution that specifies rules of legitimate political action. 
In times past, of course, the norms of legitimate political action were generated and enforced by 
monarchs or dictators. There was no confusion over their content and little reason for most of us to 
become concerned with their genesis. Our primary concern was in making certain that we did not 
violate them or in finding ways to maneuver around them. In turn, the security of the ultimate 
enforcer of these norms -- the monarch or dictator himself -- derived from our common fear and 
belief that if any person or small group of persons acted otherwise, sanctions would be applied. No 
matter how well or poorly the dictator or monarch governed, we knew the cost of deviation, including 
the cost of failing to participate in a sanction we believed unjust. Revolutions, then, occur when a 
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large enough part of society comes to believe that they will not be punished or, out of ideological or 
patriotic conviction, that the benefits of defection exceed the likely personal costs. 
The transition to a democratic state is also a conscious process, except that unlike the process 
whereby a dictator asserts his authority, democratic transition entails the establishment of a set of 
norms that are based on the principles of self -governance, the rule of law, and respect for individual 
rights. A constitution, in turn, is the central component of this norm-generating process because it 
defines the institutions of governance - - courts, legislatures, electoral laws, executive offices - - and 
it defines the relation of these institutions to each other and to the people. These institutions are like 
norms because they consist of bundles of rules. The description ofa legislature; for example; includes 
the rules whereby its members are elected, the rules that define legitimate and illegitimate political 
opposition, the rules under which voters vote and political parties operate to fill legislative seats, the 
rules that dictate legislative deliberations, and the rules that specify how the product of those 
deliberations (laws) are to be ultimately enforced. 
That the construction of a democratic society focuses on the creation of institutions is one of the 
things that distinguishes it from an earlier experiment. That experiment, the Communist one, was 
predicated on the assumption that social norms can be changed so that people would equate private 
and social values. Under the assumption that if people could be "perfected" to pursue purely social 
values, socially desirable ends would prevail automatically. Consequently, the construction of 
subsidiary norms of enforcement were ignored. Instead, the leadership of the Party or the dictate of 
an autocrat would substitute during any transitional period. That idea is now bankrupt, because we 
know that values and beliefs cannot be divorced from individual self-interest and because as we have 
learned all too painfully, the autocrat can too easily pervert the institutions he controls. 
Democracy operates with a different assumption. To reiterate James Madison's famous premise, 
"The seeds of faction are sown in the nature of man," so that self-interest will continue to shape 
people's actions. Hence, rather than trying to perfect people, democracy seeks instead to redirect that 
self-interest and to develop a consensus about norms of an entirely different type. Specifically, it 
seeks to develop norms about the legitimacy of procedures, rules, and institutional structures that 
channels self-interest in socially acceptable ways and in ways that reenforce people's incentives to 
maintain those institutions. 
Thus, when we speak of a country as having a democratic tradition, we do not meant that its 
citizens are somehow more perfect or pursue different ends than people elsewhere. We mean instead 
that they hold a consensus over the legitimacy of particular institutions and individual rights, that 
they expect their fellow citizens to act in accordance with the rules that describe those institutions, 
and that they have incentives to sanction those who act contrary to these expectations. 
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If the act of democratic norm-creation is performed well, these norms and their associated 
institutions direct people's actions in the intended way; if they are designed poorly, then they either 
fail to influence actions or they influence them in unintended and undesirable ways. But now we 
come to the central and critical question: What determines whether these norms, these bundles of 
rules, are designed well or poorly? How do we know that a constitution is complete or incomplete, 
well- or poorly-crafted, appropriate for a society or inappropriate? 
The other essays in this series try to give substance to different parts of the answer to these 
questions by focusing on specific institutions and processes. However, in providing details, we should 
not loose sight of the underlying mechanism whereby constitutional rules are enforced." Democratic 
institutions and rules that work well are followed and enforced in much the same way as social norms. 
The politician who contemplates an action that dishonors his position, the legislator seeking to subvert 
parliamentary procedure, and the potential tyrant desirous of usurping power will be constrained from 
these actions if they believe that existing political institutions give society the incentive to sanction 
such actions, if those institutions coordinate society to resist this subversion so that their self-interest 
is to act otherwise. 
The great trick to constructing stable democratic institutions, then, is this: Rules (or the bundles 
of rules we call institutions) that are consistent with the normative values we commonly associate with 
democratic practice -- the values specified, for instance, in a bill of rights -- must be constructed 
so that it is in everyone's interest to abide by them, so that it is in society's interest to punish defectors 
(as when voters act to defeat an incumbent politician), so that we do not create incentives for 
subsequent detrimental changes in institutional structure, and so that the outcomes that eventually 
emerge are deemed as beneficial as those that any other feasible configuration of institutions can 
generate. 
Satisfying this requirement imposes restrictions on feasible institutions and workable rules. First, 
democratic rules must be understandable to most people and should allow for as little ambiguity as 
possible. They should be generally understandable because they are social norms and norms that 
cannot be easily understood cannot serve their function; they should be unambiguous because the self­
interest of politicians will lead them in the direction of trying to take advantage of any ambiguity. 
A rule such as "the legislature will pass no law infringing on the freedom of the press" may seem too 
restrictive and in want of qualification (to avoid, for example, the possibility that the press will 
publish material damaging to national security). But if the courts that interpret and enforce this rule 
are themselves constituted correctly, if there is a social consensus as to acceptable qualifications of 
press freedom, and if society's other political institutions are well-crafted (if, for example, the 
legislature that appoint judges is responsive to society), then the exceptions the courts allow will be 
acceptable. 
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Second, those rules should be consistent. Just as we cannot have two social norms that contradict 
each other lest one or the other becomes unenforceable, we cannot have constitutional rules that do 
the same. Contradictory rules arise, for example, when we give both a legislature and a president the 
constitutional right to promulgate laws of the same type or when we give two government agencies 
jurisdiction over the same policy. A draft constitution, then, should be examined as an exercise in 
logic or in much the same way as the mathematician checks the proof of a new theorem -- by 
examining the proof for completeness and logical consistency. 
Third, and as part of the preceding evaluation, the consequences of constitutional rules should, 
as much as is humanly possible, be mapped out in order to avoid · the possibility of unintended 
consequences. This "mapping out" includes assessing how different rules interact to reenforce or to 
negate each other -- describing, for instance, the potential areas of legislative-executive conflict. It 
also includes evaluating the private motives that a particular set of rules will engender. Will lead 
legislators to be concerned primarily with the interests of the constituency they ostensibly represent 
and how might such a concern conflict with the private interests of members of the executive branch? 
What electoral laws encourage the fragmentation or consolidation of political parties, and what policy 
positions will parties advocate if they are fragmented; if they are consolidated? 
Fourth, institutions should be in equilibrium. It matters little, for example, if we give a president 
powers over a legislature that we deem essential (such as the right to veto legislation) if, at the same 
time, the legislature can subvert the very essence of institutional constraints because we allow it to 
wholly control the relationship of the president to the people via control over the president's method 
of election (as the current Rumyantsev draft constitution does). Similarly, legislative institutions 
cannot be in equilibrium if we assert that legislators should be responsible to the electorate but at the 
same time we allow legislators to define for themselves the rules under which they must seek 
reelection. We should assume that legislators will pursue their self-interest of seeking to remain in 
office; and without offsetting structures, the entire constitutional structure will soon lose meaning. 
Finally, we select particular institutions because we believe that individually and in combination 
with each other, they will yield outcomes or processes of a particular type. We choose a federal 
government because it protects local autonomy, a president because we believe that the state requires 
focused leadership, direct election of the president because we believe this method is just and because 
we want to encourage a particular party structure, single-member legislative constituencies because 
we believe that that is the best way to protect the federalism that other parts of the constitution 
define, and so on. But most importantly, we choose specific combinations of institutions because we 
want outcomes that everyone will perceive as being in their self-interest. We do this because we 
understand that the institutions of the state are merely the agents of the people and that if they fail 
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to serve their purpose, then it is the people's right to demand different rules of social-political 
organization. 
7. Citizens in a Democracy: Must We Be Something Other Than What We Are?
It is common throughout the world's democracies for people to be told that they have special
responsibilities they must meet in order to maintain their form of government -- they should be 
informed of public policy, they should participate in democratic processes, they should adopt special 
attitudes about the civil rights of others, and so on. But these admonitions are reminiscent of the ones 
articulated by a regime that sought to forge a Communist utopia by> breeding a ·new social 
consciousness. Thus, they seem at odds with the argument that democracy proceeds under the 
assumption that people cannot be perfected and that the design of democratic institutions presumes 
that the pursuit of a sometimes narrow self-interest is a constant in human society. 
This apparent inconsistency demands resolution, especially in Russia. First, we do not want to 
endanger Russia's transition to democracy by fostering the incorrect and dangerous belief that any 
radical transformation of the human psyche is an essential component of that transition. Second, we 
want to confront the oft-repeated assertion that democratic principles are alien to the Russia 
character, that Russia's political traditions preclude the possibility that its people can manage a 
democracy, and that only the strong leader can direct the destiny of this diverse and sometimes 
anarchic society. Thus, we ask: Are there qualities that citizens of stable democracies possess that 
Russians do not? Is there any inherent reason for supposing that democracy cannot take root in 
Russia owing to the "special character" of her people? 
Our answer to such questions is NO. However, our answer is not predicated on the supposition 
that Russian's do not possess a unique character, traditions, or culture (as well as a history of 
authoritarian rule). We predicate it instead on the argument that democracy does not demand that 
we be much different from what we are. 
This is not to say that the smooth operation of democracy does not require that we think a bit 
differently about rights and liberties and about the rule of law. Certainly it requires the gradual 
development of different expectations about the role of the state and about our relationship to it. We 
must believe that it is legitimate to oppose those who would tread on our rights, and certainly 
democracy works poorly when we do not respect the right of others. But, as we hope to show, 
whatever differences are required are but slight adjustments in how any modern society functions, 
and they come naturally if our political institutions are designed correctly. 
To illustrate, consider the admonition that the citizens of a democracy should keep themselves 
informed of politics and of the actions of those who claim to represent them in national, regional, or 
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local legislatures. After all, ignorance, we are told, is the lever used most commonly by those who 
would subvert our freedoms. 
The simple fact, though, is that most of us have more immediate concerns than paying close 
attention to the political waltz of politicians in Moscow and elsewhere -- concerns that include 
feeding our families, securing our personal safety, maintaining our friendships, furnishing our 
apartments, teaching our children, and earning a living. Moreover, being fully informed about 
politics is not only time consuming, but it also can appear fruitless. It is fruitless (even dangerous) 
in a dictatorship. But things do not always seem much better in a democracy. After all, few in a 
democracy can greatly effect political outcomes directly, if we can effect them at-all. In voting for 
president or even for a local representative, the likelihood that our vote will be critical to the final 
outcome is infinitesimal. Thus, in deciding how to invest our time, we are much more likely to invest 
it in those things we can control than in the distant matters of political process. 
What we have just said applies to people everywhere. Few Americans know the name of their 
representatives, few Frenchmen know the organization of the European Economic Committee, few 
Costa Ricans know the impact of their government's trade policies, and few Indians know the political 
composition of their Congress. Indeed, politics there seems little different than a sports event: People 
may cheer passionately for one team or another, but they know that there is little they can do to 
influence the outcome. Or, to put matters differently, if given a choice between investing in learning 
about the details of government policy versus learning about, say, how to repair the plumbing of a 
broken sink, it is far better to invest in plumbing. 
Nevertheless, democracies function and we must ask: How can great masses of people, preoccupied 
with things other than self-governance, self-govern? 
The answer to this question lies in the extra-constitutional institutions and organizations that arise 
in a democratic society -- political parties, agricultural collectives, local political clubs, professional 
organizations, workers groups, and the like. Democracy is something more than a great mass of 
citizen-voters and constitutionally proscribed institutions led by a handful of political elites. It 
consists also of a large number of subsidiary structures that arise to connect people to their 
government. These structures organize, lead, and inform. They teach us essential facts, they guide 
our vote, and they provide the means whereby people can peacefully organize to protest against 
policies they deem unwise or opposed to their self-interest. 
Such structures do not arise in a democracy because people there are somehow different from 
those elsewhere. There is nothing in the water or air that gives Americans, Taiwanese, Frenchmen, 
Indians, Germans, or Costa Ricans any special advantage that makes them more able than Russians 
at creating these organizations. Russians are not perennially disadvantaged merely because eighty 
30 
years ago a Czar prohibited meaningful political action or because such action was dangerous when 
the country was a despotism. 
The organizations that fill the gap between citizen-voters and constitutional institutions arise in 
part because those institutions can be influenced by concerted collective action. Because worker 
collectives, neighborhood committees, and social clubs can mobilize voters for and against political 
candidates, citizens can act through them to influence political outcomes. And when offered a menu 
of organizations in which to participate, people learn which serve their interests and which advocate 
contrary positions. Indeed, it is often unnecessary for most people to even participate actively in such 
things -- they can merely observe who it is that these organizations support and oppose;' In this way, 
rather than becoming informed directly about candidates and their policies, people can take learn 
from the actions of others. 
For example, if a person is concerned about environmental policy and if there is a full range of 
interest groups seeking to influence such policy -- some favoring those who are indifferent to 
ecological matters, some favoring consumers, and some advocating extremist positions -- then we can 
monitor the candidates these groups support. In this way, these groups save us from the necessity of 
becoming fully informed about the details of policy or the sincerity of each candidate's utterances. 
We would not argue that this is a perfect process or that, from time to time, people are not misled. 
But if the marketplace for political ideas is allowed to operate, then experience has taught us that 
people will learn about their self-interest and learn who holds an equivalent interest. 
An poignant example is America's Association for Retired People (AARP). The AARP, which 
monitors public retirement and medical care programs and informs its members about the positions 
of politicians on these issues, is almost certainly the most powerful interest group in the United States. 
The elderly not only care greatly about such issues, but they also stand ready to support or oppose 
political candidate with their votes. Thus, with millions of members (anyone above the age of 55 can 
join for a modest annual fee), the politician who earns the ire of this association does so at his or her 
peril. In summary, then, the AARP monitors the information of all relevant politicians and holds a 
reputation of providing accurate information; the elderly rely for their information about politicians 
on the AARP's publications; and, completing the circle, politicians are loth to advocate or to vote for 
policies that are not in the interest of the elderly, because they know that their actions are being 
watching. 
Of course, it may seem unexceptional that an entities like the AARP arise in "mature democracies" 
with traditions of citizen political organization and participation. What we must explain is why we 
anticipate the emergence of such things in countries recently making the transition to democracy. 
After all, we cannot yet exclude the possibility that political leaders will seek to exert authoritarian 
control over this marketplace of political ideas when it is in their interest to do so. That is, we cannot 
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assume that those in power will not try whenever possible to preclude the existence of those things 
and activities that might threaten their position. 
There are in fact two protections in a democracy against such a possibility, each of which depends 
on the other for its success and neither of which imposes special requirements on culture, or tradition. 
The first condition is self-evident -- a free and unfettered press. However democratic a political 
system might appear, if the state controls the activities of the press, then history teaches us an 
unambiguous lesson: Those in positions of authority within a government are incapable of resisting 
the temptation to have the media operate for their benefit. And if the media operate primarily for 
the benefit of those in power, then we are soon deprived of the right and the ability to organize, to 
uncover, and to oppose the deceptions that political elites will attempt. 
In recognition of this fact, it is essential that constitutions contain only an unambiguous and 
unqualified guarantee of press freedom, so as to constrain the state to the greatest extent possible. 
But we require an additional guarantee, which is provided by a second protection - - competitive 
elections. If democracy has one essential characteristic, it is the opportunity it gives us to replace one 
set of leaders with another. The thing that distinguishes democracy from other forms of government 
is its basic premise that the ultimate sovereign is the people and that their ultimate right of 
sovereignty is the right to choose their political leaders. Hence, without competitive elections, 
nothing else matters. 
The difficulty here, however, is that if competitive elections require a free press and if the free 
press require competitive elections, what guarantees that both protections will sustain themselves 
simultaneously? Fortunately, it is within the cauldron of such elections that many if not most of the 
organizations arise that allow citizens to become informed and to mobilize politically, including even 
a free press. Organizations do not arise like mushrooms in a forrest merely because citizens seek to 
influence politicians. They arise and are sustained out of the self-interest of politicians. They arise 
in large part because one set of politicians seeks to defeat some other set, and because politicians have 
an incentive to engineer and support the organizations they think will support them. 
Returning to the example of the AARP, it might seem that most politicians would find the 
existence of such an organization discomforting. After all, who appreciates having someone looking 
over one's shoulder at all times, waiting to broadcast mistakes to anyone who will listen. But 
politicians can just as easily welcome such things, since political action groups are often the vehicle 
they use to dislodge an incumbent from office or for retaining that office once it is secured. There 
is, in fact, a considerable number of state and national legislators in the United States who owe their 
positions to organizations like the AARP. 
Thus, citizen-organizations serve a dual purpose -- they, in collaboration with the mass media, 
facilitate the flow of information and, at the same time, they assist politicians in their careers. Out 
32 
of this symbiotic relationship and within the context of competitive of elections comes the protection 
of the right to organize, the right to possess information about political leaders, and the right to 
disseminate that information. And in this way, the citizens of a democracy do not rely for the 
preservation of their liberties on the existence of honorable, fair, democratic or just political leaders -
- they rely instead on the self interest of those public officials who, if processes operate as planned, 
will act honorably, fairly, and so on even if their nature would otherwise lead them to act differently. 
Citizens in a democracy, then, do not rely on the development of any special character wholly 
divorced from their culture to support their institutions. As with politicians, they rely on their own 
notions of self-interest and the self-interest of others. ··French,·Germans, Spaniards; and Austrians 
do not abandon their identities merely because they live in democracies. New values may be added 
to old ones, but the form of the organizations that service democratic process can take many forms, 
where those forms are influenced not only by formal constitutional structures, but also by the values 
and the different modes of social action that are most compatible with each society's enduring 
structure. 
In a society of immigrants such as America, organizations centered around national identities may 
play an especially important role as people seek to maintain their cultural heritages. In Russia, other 
organizations centered around the farm or work collective can serve the same political purposes. The 
public policies that evolve in Sweden are not the same as those that develop in Australia; the 
formalities of debate and the rules of procedure are not the same in the Britain's parliament as they 
are Taiwan's legislative yuan; and the form and functions of the judiciary in France can be quite 
dissimilar from those that exist in neighboring Spain. 
It remains true, of course, that as Russia's democracy matures, people will learn to hold different 
attitudes toward their government and toward each other. Beliefs and expectations will change as we 
grow accustomed to self-government. But those beliefs and expectations are not required to be 
wholly in conflict with those social norms and values that Russian's believe lie at the core of their 
culture. It also remains true that the right to vote, the right to organize, and the freedom of the press 
remain, in any democracy, in a delicate balance and we must learn to recognize things that threaten 
this equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is worth keeping in mind that one difference between democracy 
and communism was communism's supposition that it could change Russian traditions and values as 
well as human nature; democracy requires no such assumption. 
8. The People's Congress: Can They Govern Us If They Cannot Govern Themselves?
Legislators scream epithets, someone pushes someone else, and soon a group charges the lectern,
reaching, grabbing, and punching. Sounds like the People's Congress? Perhaps. But this scene could 
just as easily describe Japan's Diet or Taiwan's Yuan (where not only punches but also chairs flew 
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through the air). Such events are not uncommon in the world's legislatures. In the early years of the 
U.S. Congress, many legislators attended sessions armed with pistols, and as late as 1 856 one of them, 
Charles Sumner, was beaten senseless on the floor of the Senate by the nephew of an irate political 
opponent. 
Of course, few of us would want to admit any admiration for Russia's parliament. The economy 
is in shambles and new political and economic structures await construction, while the Congress 
debates whether to replace old soviet symbols with the imperial double-headed eagle. Should we care 
about such things when inflation exceeds 2000%? Shrill words, threats of coups, and personal insults 
reverberate through the halls rather than eloquence and pragmatic discussions of public policy. Why 
should we be surprised that legislators are fair game as the butt of our jokes and as targets of our 
frustration. 
It remains true, though, that in comparison to the possibilities -- armed insurrection or explicit 
violations of constitutional principles -- this last session of the Congress was a model of probity and 
parliamentarinism. Committees met, ballots were cast and counted as in any stable democracy, and 
important choices were made. Those choices might not always have been the ones we might have 
preferred and it may have seemed at times that the participants were more intent on championing 
ideological positions rather than practical solutions. Nevertheless, the integrity of the state appears 
to have survived, and indeed, even Russia survived. 
Perhaps the surest sign of success is that almost no one got all they wanted, and extremists got less 
than anyone else. Only in dictatorships does anyone (the dictator) prevail unambiguously. In a 
democracy, in contrast, people must compromise, and the noise and disorder that often characterizes 
this process comes from the fact that we are generally compelled to modify our positions even as we 
protest, kicking and screaming all the way, any dishonor of deeply held convictions. Equally 
important is the fact that legislators honored constitutional constraints (even though the constitution 
itself requires a complete overhaul). Critical issues were frequently decided by a few votes, and yet 
no troops overturned the result. The losers on some issues (often the majority, owing to the extra­
ordinary majority required to pass constitutional amendments) found ways to claim victory without 
denouncing the genealogy of their opponents and proceeded to seek victories on subsequent votes. 
Indeed, despite the noise and rhetoric, Russia seems well on its way toward operating within the 
constraints of its new constitutional language, fully appreciative of the fact that such language is an 
important part of stable democratic process. 
But none of this means that the current legislative structure will satisfy long-term needs. Some 
persons argue that a new legislature should be elected immediately; others argue that doing so only 
increases the likelihood that some autonomous republics will use that opportunity to secede. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of who prevails in this decision, we should look carefully at what the 
Congress should set in place before 1995, the date of the next regularly scheduled elections. 
First, Russia needs a constitution that unambiguously defines the structure of a legislature to 
represent all of us and that will stand in permanent session so it can evaluate and formulate policy 
coherently. Second, the rules under which members of that legislature are selected, including the 
precise relationship between voters and representatives, must be specified more clearly. And third, 
whatever changes are made should be made quickly since there is much to be done nationally and 
regionally before meaningful elections can be implemented. 
If the current Congress suffers from an specific malady it·is ·that its members· do not have a 
sufficiently well-defined relationship to those they ostensibly represent. This malady derives from 
the fact that legislators have not yet contemplated the necessity of running for reelection in 
competitive elections -- indeed, some have never even observed such an election. If there is anything 
that draws a politician's attention to his or her responsibilities, aside from a knock on the head with 
a hammer, it is the prospect of competing in an election against someone who will publicly broadcast 
every personal flaw and every incorrect decision to anyone who will listen. 
Undoubtedly, the prospect of competitive elections is frightening to a great many of Russia's 
legislators. But, of necessity, it will bring order to legislative deliberations, whatever is the ultimate 
institutional structure of that legislature. The absence of the electoral threat and Russia's 
inexperience with competitive elections has lead to a fragmented "party" structure within the Congress 
and the Supreme Soviet. Things labeled parties are not parties at all. They are not organizations 
designed to present the electorate with alternative policies and programs and to secure votes for those 
candidates who compete under their labels. Instead, they are, for the most part, protest groups, 
ideological clusters, cabals, and personal factions designed to advance the careers of specific 
individuals. With the threat of competitive elections so distant and unfamiliar, there is no need for 
these "parties" to coalesce, to negotiate seriously their differences with other legislators, or to act so 
that an electorate views them as offering responsible policy alternatives. In fact, doing so is taken 
as a sign of weakness, a failure of leadership, and a prelude to dissolution. 
In contrast to this characterization, political parties in "mature" democracies are organized for the 
express purpose of winning elections. They are the devices politicians use to organize support within 
their constituencies and to communicate to the electorate their policy predispositions and their 
commitment to a rule of law. Parties organize in this way because voters, concerned about more 
immediate personal matters, have little reason to devote much time to learning which candidate best 
represents their interests. If forced to listen to every promise and every prescription for change, they 
would soon be overwhelmed and confused. Ordinary citizens, then, look for cues as to how to vote, 
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and one potentially important cue is a candidate's party label. If a party label can be made to convey 
anything, including the integrity of those who run under its banner, voters will use these labels in 
deciding who to support. And parties that succeed in associating themselves with attractive policies 
and attractive candidates will survive; all others will eventually disappear or will be relegated to the 
sidelines of political events. The imperatives of electoral competition, then, compel legislators to 
cultivate the labels under which they seek election and reelection, so that members of a party within 
parliament have an incentive to ensure that their actions are responsible and serve a clear purpose. 
In this way, the emergence of parties that seek to win votes facilitate order within the legislature. 
The absence of the immediate threat of competitive elections also impacts oil theinternal structure 
of a legislature. Without such a threat there is no need for legislators to organize themselves so that 
they can proceed efficiently and in the public's interest. Presently, procedures, committee structures, 
and debate are organized on an ad hoc basis, since the only compelling force is one's definition of 
patriotism, unguided personal ambition, or whim. 
This is not to say that such motivations cannot lead legislators to support correct policies -- that 
legislators will not seek to advance Russia's interests without fearing an electorate. There are in fact 
a great many members of the People's Congress whose only desire is to advance Russia's transition 
to democracy and to ensure her prosperity. But democracies do not place their faith in the fortuitous 
of accidental selection of well-intentioned representatives. They place their faith instead in ensuring 
that legislators will be directed to organize themselves in our interest because to do otherwise would 
lead us to replace them in the next election. 
We do not suppose that legislatures are organized to do "good," or to serve our interest. We assume 
that they will organize themselves to serve their own self-interest -- that they will reveal their votes 
when it is in their interest to do so, that they will vote by secret ballot when they fear that doing 
otherwise will be personally costly, that they will structure their committees to ensure the reelection 
of those who do the structuring, that they will service the complaints of their constituents only when 
failing to do so costs them electoral support, and that they will consult experts only when they might 
be sanctioned for making ill-advised decisions. Hence, what we must do through constitutional 
design is ensure that their self-interest parallels ours. 
Competitive elections are one route to this end. Such elections compel legislators, even those who 
seek merely to get reelected without any convictions about policy, to develop an internal organization 
so as to maximize their chances of personal survival. Hence, if we have designed our electoral and 
representative mechanisms well, legislators will, in developing an internal structure that best suits 
their purposes, develop a structure that serves our purposes. 
Several practical proscriptions follow from this somewhat cynical (but not ill-founded) 
perspective. First, rather than pay any attention within a constitution to the "correct" organization 
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of a legislature, that document should focus instead on clear specifications of modes of representation 
and electoral processes. If a constitution tells a legislature to organize in a way that does not serve 
its members' interests, then we can be certain that they will soon find ways to operate differently. 
Constitutional provisions requiring specific committee structures, specific ways of resolving disputes 
between legislative assemblies, and specific rules of procedure are unenforceable -- they are the first 
things to succumb to reinterpretation and amendment. 
On the other hand, specifying modes of representation and allocating jurisdictional authority as 
to who will write and oversee election rules are things that lie at the heart of constitutional design. 
Unfortunately, these are things that require refinement in the current draft constitutions prepared 
by Russia's Constitutional Commission. For example, that draft requires that members of the lower 
house, the State Duma, be elected on a territorial basis, which we assume means that the country will 
be divided into distinct legislative districts so that one or more representative will be elected from 
each district. But what is left unspecified is who will be responsible for defining these districts. Will 
it be the governments of the autonomous republics and oblasts that contain them or will it be the 
national legislature itself? We believe it should be the autonomous republics and oblasts so as to 
strengthen Russia's federal character, but the jurisdiction of this decision cannot be left to 
interpretation. 
In turn, who will oversee the creation and enforcement of electoral laws? Will autonomous 
republics and oblasts have the opportunity to determine the rules under which they elect 
representatives (single-member versus multi-member districts, ballot structures, campaign finance 
laws) or will these matters be dictated by Moscow? Again, our preference is for local determination 
of such things for purposes of strengthening federal relationships. But until these matters are 
resolved, the ambiguity of electoral rules will result in ambiguity of legislative process. 
At this point, the reader may wonder how electoral laws - - established in a constitution or 
elsewhere -- can ever be enforced and remain stable. Why should electoral institutions dictate 
legislative structure rather than the other way around? What keeps a particular dominant 
configuration of power and interests within the legislature from manipulating election law so that that 
law serves only their interests? 
In fact, electoral laws are enforceable for a very simple reason -- maintaining those rules will soon 
be in the self-interest of legislators themselves. On this point, another American example is 
instructive. It is generally accepted that America's method of electing a president has certain 
disadvantages, including leaving open the possibility that a popular vote winner will not be elected 
(as happened in 1 824, 1876, 1 888,  arguably in 1960, and nearly in 1968). Hence, every decade or so 
its Senate holds hearing to consider a variety of reform proposals. To date, however, nothing much 
has changed for a very simple reason -- no one is certain that any change will provide as sure a 
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guarantee of a two-party system as does the current arrangement. On the other hand, one thing is 
certain - - legislators who must decide any constitutional matter are winners at the game of two-party 
politics and they have every incentive to maintain that aspect of the game. Winners in any game 
rarely want to change its rules, since such changes threaten them with the prospect of losers becoming 
winners. Rarely does the person winning at some card game suggest playing a different game; 
arguments for change come from the losers. And rarely does anyone winning at roulette prefer to 
move to some other location in a casino. The same is true in politics. Unsurprisingly, then, the 
American Republican and Democratic parties have little difficulty in colluding to ensure that third­
party candidates have as small a chance as possible at disturbing their competition. 
This discussion of how electoral laws become self -enforcing suggests also that those laws should 
be chosen carefully and in full appreciation of their long-term consequences. Because they will be 
more difficult to change later, we should be certain that they influence party structures in the right 
ways. But before we can determine which laws might be most appropriate for Russia, we must 
consider several other matters that impact on a legislature's performance, including the advantages 
and disadvantages of a two-chamber legislature and the precise role we can expect a legislature to 
serve in a federal state. 
9. A Two-Chamber Legislature: Isn't One More Than Enough?
All drafts of a new constitution for Russia propose a two-chamber legislature -- a State Duma (the
"lower" chamber) and a Federal Council (the "upper" chamber). And, abandoning the idea of Supreme 
Soviets elected by a larger assembly, both branches will be separately and directly elected. However, 
in light of the recent display of disarray in the People's Congress, we are entitled to ask why two such 
creatures are needed when one provides all the entertainment we can tolerate. Wouldn't two chambers 
vying for power only add to the confusion and to the possibility of an even more dangerous stalemate 
between the legislature and president? Why create more public officials than we already have? After 
all, public officials demand salaries, but they do not seem to yield a large return on this investment? 
But before we proceed with unrestrained cynicism and use the alleged failings of the current 
Congress as a basis for predicting the consequences of any new arrangement we should first restate 
some arguments from our previous essay as to why the future need not be like the past. The key fact 
is that the character of the current Congress cannot be attributed to the supposition that it is 
dominated by large numbers of unrepentant communists, entrenched apparatchiks, and faceless 
mediocrities. Regardless of one's view of the calibre of individual members, a legislature is not 
merely some simple arithmetic sum of the people in it. Instead, the Congress is what it is because it 
came into being before anyone knew it was to be a national rather than a republic legislature and 
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because its members have not yet felt the need to organize themselves into a professional law-giving 
institution. 
We appreciate that it may be difficult to imagine some members of the Congress becoming 
professional at much of anything. However, the differences between this Congress and a new 
legislature will not come from any magical process that produces wiser and more deliberative 
politicians. This difference will come from the ways in which legislators are compelled, by 
constitutional provisions, to represent the rest of Russia. With the prospect of regularly scheduled 
and frequent elections -- an especially frightening idea for those who have never confronted such 
things -- legislators will have to do more than scurry about whispering rumors of cabals or hatching 
plots. They will instead be forced to take positive action, to formulate policy, to draft specific 
legislation, to learn what it is their constituents want, and to anticipate what policies an election 
opponent might propose in attempting to unseat them. They will find it necessary to maintain 
permanent staffs, and to deliberate, hold committee meetings, and vote throughout most of the year. 
The mouthing of ideological generalities and personal insults will not wholly disappear, but they 
should subside if only because legislators will fear an electorate that views them as being 
unprofessional and unable to express and represent their views effectively. 
Of course, what we have just said does not address the issue of a two chamber legislature and does 
not answer the question: Wouldn't it be far simpler and more in keeping with Russia's traditions to 
retain the present structure and "improve" it merely by holding new elections? So turning to that 
issue, we note that one argument for two chambers is that this design is the one used most frequently 
elsewhere. But there are other more practical justifications. First, legislators represent, and there are 
different things that require representation. Second, division makes it more difficult for this branch 
of government to do stupid or dangerous things. And third, dividing the legislature into two parts 
protects it from being too easily influenced by those public passions that might otherwise destabilize 
a country. 
The first justification takes us to an important question that will concern any assembly that drafts 
a constitution. Specifically, who it is that is to be represented -- the citizens of Russia or, because 
Russia is a federation, its different regions and autonomous republics? 
It is generally assumed that the State Duma will represent people -- that the country will be 
divided into districts and that one member will be elected from each district (at least this is one way 
to interpret some vague language that requires clarification). So, if every district is contained within 
a republic or oblast -- within the component parts of the Russian Federation -- then we can say that 
each such region will be represented by as many legislators as there are districts in its territory. In 
this way, the Duma represents people and regions simultaneously. 
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However, if the Duma represents people, then the principle of equal representation requires that 
each member of the Duma represent approximately the same number of persons as any other 
legislator. Thus, the proportion of legislators elected from each republic and oblast will 
approximately equal that region's proportion of the population. But now we encounter the objection 
that some autonomous republics and sparsely populated regions should not be penalized merely 
because they are less populous than others. And since some regions may fear domination by other 
parts of the Federation, this concern is likely to generate some contentious debate. 
It is for this reason that we introduce a second chamber, the Federal Council, that must also 
approve legislation before it becomes policy or law. By requiring that all regions have identical 
representation in the Council (with possible adjustments for autonomous regions within krays), every 
region has an equal chance of blocking legislation it opposes -- no region is any more or less pivotal 
than any other. 
This compromise with the principle of equal representation of citizens is made because forging 
a federation is forming an alliance, and a two-chamber legislature is one of the compromises we must 
make to achieve that end. However, making that compromise raises a number of subsidiary issues 
that the current draft constitutions resolve without explanation or leave unresolved through vague 
language. First, why will the State Duma be larger that the Federal Council? Why are the Duma and 
Council elected simultaneously and for the same terms? What is the meaning of "territorial 
representation?" Who will determine the rules under which elections are conducted? And who will 
decide the character of each district of each member of the Duma -- who will draw legislative district 
boundaries? 
Once again, we want to emphasize that these issue cannot be addressed separately. We cannot 
choose, say, a five-year term merely because this number has been used in the past or because it is 
the average of some sample of legislatures from other countries. Our choice here must be consistent 
with some overall idea about what it is we are trying to accomplish with our representative 
institutions. 
To see what we mean, notice that if the only consideration in the creation of a two-chamber 
legislature is the desire to reach a federal compromise, then we would be unable to explain why so 
many states, even small non-federal ones, abide by the same format. Britain's House of Lords may 
exist out of tradition, but what accounts for the upper chambers of Austria, France, or Iceland? 
In fact, there are other considerations. First, imagine a country divided into some number of 
equally populous districts, each of which elects one representative to the legislature. Then a majority 
of voters in a majority of districts can control all legislation. Since fifty percent of fifty percent 
equals twenty five percent, as few as one quarter of the population can, theoretically, control the 
legislature. Normally we would not expect such extreme things to occur. But the bias a single-
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chamber legislature allows can create significant tensions when, for example, an urban minority 
dominates a rural majority, or when, say, agricultural interests predominate over industrial concerns 
despite a opposite population balance. 
There are several ways to correct for such imbalances. One is to draw legislative districts that are 
homogeneous in terms of the character of the people within them. But this alternative is both 
impractical when populations are mixed and divisive because, in drawing district boundaries, it pits 
different parts of society against each other in the struggle for advantage. Another alternative is to 
elect legislators using nationwide proportional representation. But PR in Russia would only increase 
the incentives for a highly fractured party system, which is something that Russia oughMo avoid. 
The third possibility is the two-chamber legislature, which accomplishes its purpose since legislation 
must now secure two majorities, one in each chamber. 
It is at this point that we encounter the logic of several other alternative constitutional provisions. 
Notice that two chambers has the intended effect of making it more difficult for a minority to control 
the legislature only if their bases of representation are not identical. Otherwise the same voters can 
control both chambers. Thus, we should avoid electing members of one chamber from precisely the 
same districts that we elect the members of the other. On the other hand, we do not want to 
undermine the federal character of the legislature or weaken the incentives for the formation of 
national parties. Hence, the usual method is to let members of the "upper" chamber represent several 
lower chamber constituencies by dividing the country's separate regions into lower chamber districts. 
This is, of course, the alternative employed in the several alternative draft constitutions for Russia. 
However, even this precaution is not generally assumed to be wholly adequate. An additional 
precaution -- one that neither the Rumyantsev nor the Sobchak constitutions consider -- is to elect 
members of the lower and upper houses to terms of different lengths. Although it may seem 
reasonable to want to make the government more responsive to public opinion by electing all of the 
national government at the same time, doing so leaves the government vulnerable to transitory yet 
intense public passions. Distinct terms of office in which we electing members of the lower house, 
for example, every three years and one half the members of the upper house every three years for six 
year terms provides some insurance against this possibility and lends greater stability and continuity 
to the government. 
There remains one last issue that we have not yet discussed. Specifically, assuming that we have 
resolved the matter of two versus one chamber, of the construction of election districts, and of the 
length of legislative terms, we must still decide the rules under which legislators will be elected and 
who will set those rules. Rather than discuss election laws -- a complex matter -- we will focus 
instead on who should have the authority to choose. And here there essentially three alternatives: ( ! )  
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Set the rules in the constitution; (2) relegate their determination to laws passed by the national 
legislature; and (3) allow those laws to be chosen by the autonomous republics and oblasts. 
No method characterizes all countries. Each country must choose in accordance with its special 
circumstances, and Russia's special circumstance, aside from evident economic problems, her size, 
ethnic diversity, and the presence of increasingly strident demands for regional autonomy, is the fact 
that her population is largely unfamiliar with democratic processes. People have voted, but rarely if 
ever in competitive elections. People have been members of parties, but not in parties they 
themselves organize to win competitive elections. 
For these reasons it is tempting to want to direct things from Moscow. However, as much as 
political leaders in Moscow might think they know best, people must learn about democratic practice 
firsthand. And people learn about the necessity for compromise, about participating in politics, and 
about the roles of political parties only when they have the opportunity to decide issues that concern 
them and over which they have direct control. These things cannot be learned merely by voting once 
every four or five years. 
Democracy's classroom is local and regional politics, and creating this classroom requires giving 
local and regional authorities control over those things that do not demand national coordination. And 
one of those things is the creation, implementation, and enforcement of electoral rules and 
procedures. In creating rules for themselves, people become expert in their operation and in the 
compromises that democracy entails. Also, with decentralization, regions can tailor electoral laws to 
fit their circumstances. There is no reason, for example, why some regions cannot elect their 
representative to a national assembly by PR while others, with distinct sub-regions, cannot use single­
member constituencies so as to guarantee representation of minorities. 
Of course, we appreciate the fact that regions will seek to manipulate the selection of these 
procedures to the advantage of particular persons (although we hesitate to assert that the national 
government is immune from such incentives). But democracy cannot be imposed wholly from above. 
By requiring that all forms of local and regional governments protect individual rights and be 
democratic in other ways, a constitution can give national courts the authority to ensure that explicit 
discrimination contrary to stated values does not occur. 
Admittedly, this discussion may seem to present those who draft constitutions with a dizzying 
array of alternatives. But the different features of representation that we have discussed in this essay 
have been designed to give us some flexibility in creating a balance between the need for legislative 
stability and a legislature that is responsive to the public will. Two chambers reduces the likelihood 
that the legislature can be captured by some minority or region of the country. They give us a way 
to ensure that people are represented without undermining the autonomy of regions. And they 
provide a way to ensure stability and continuity in legislative deliberations. Russia must find its own 
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balance among these alternatives, but those who would draft and ratify a constitution should 
understand the choices they confront. 
Insofar as predicting how a two-chamber legislature will function, there are, of course, a many 
additional issues that require examination -- including the relative powers of the two branches and 
their relationship to the president. Some states place virtually all legislative power in the hands of the 
lower chamber and make the upper one little more than a ceremonial office. Others give this chamber 
only limited legislative authority, such as the right to amend the constitution. And still others give 
both chambers equal roles by requiring that all legislation be approved by both of them. Adding to 
the range of possible arrangements, those who draft· a constitution must also decide which chamber 
is to be responsible for overseeing presidential appointments. Parliamentary systems generally give 
this authority to the lower house, whereas presidential systems give it to the upper one. However, 
whatever decisions are made on these additional issues, the most critical decision concerns the 
relationship of public officials to the electorate and to the constituent parts of the Federation, since 
it is that relationship which determines the ultimate character of the state. 
10.  Do We Have to Vote to be Democratic? 
As charges and counter charges of authoritarianism, irresponsibility, and just plain stupidity filled 
the air in the aftermath of the Congress's unwillingness to confirm Gaidar's position on Yeltsin's 
cabinet, the only solution to the apparent paralysis of Russian politics seems to be to "go to the 
people." Let the people speak -- hold a referendum! But what question would voters be asked to 
answer? Will it be "Should Russia be ruled by a president or the parliament" or "Should the Congress 
have the right to fire members of the president's cabinet" or "Should the Congress be dissolved and 
forced to confront new elections" or "Should there be a new presidential election" or "Should there be 
new elections to choose everybody" or "Does Russia need a new constitution" or "Should the 
Constitution provide for a strong or weak president"? And, of course, there is the procedural issue: 
"Should the outcome of a referendum be legally binding or merely advisory?" 
Regardless of how we answer these questions, the implicit assumption in all of them is that the 
will of the people as expressed in a general plebiscite is a powerful tool in the hands of those the 
outcome supports. Who dares resist this will once it is revealed? Who prefers to be labeled 'anti­
democratic' or 'authoritarian'? Who could oppose a referendum's conclusion, except in those instances 
in which the referendum itself is worded so as to preclude anything but a single outcome (as was the 
case with Gorbachev's Union vote). 
But why is it assumed that a referendum can reveal much of anything as important as the 'popular 
will'? Why does the result of a popular vote on some policy or constitutional issue give special 
legitimacy to whatever outcome it produces? 
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The answer to these questions clearly lies in the fact that with its history of totalitarian rule, a 
popular referendum holds a special status in Russia. For a people with so little experience in voting 
in meaningful elections, the chance to do so gives their actions uncommon meaning. But if we probe 
deeper into these sentiments, we see that the special attention given to popular referenda requires two 
assumptions. The first is that the popular will exists -- that there is something to be discovered or 
revealed by voting. The second assumption is that a referendum is the most straightforward way to 
reveal that will. From these two assumptions we can infer a third - - that direct voting on referenda 
is "more democratic" than other devices. 
Formulating laws and making public policy through ·· the indirect instruments of elected 
representatives and presidents may be required if we want to treat the complexity of public affairs 
in an orderly way. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suppose that an outcome determined by a 
direct appeal to the public has more legitimacy than any other. Because elected officials can be 
corrupt or otherwise insensitive to public needs and preferences, the argument continues, it is best, 
whenever feasible, to consult the public directly on important matters. 
Certainly, a healthy respect for public opinion is not something that ought to be minimized. When 
it is minimized or ignored, democracy disappears. But none of the assumptions we have set forth to 
j ustify an exalted position for the outcomes of referenda is generally valid, and this fact brings into 
question the extent to which Russia should rely on plebiscites for resolving contentious and divisive 
issues. 
Consider first the matter of the existence of a popular will. Certainly this will exists if 
preferences are unanimous. But in this instance there is rarely a need to learn that will through 
referenda; no voting is required to justify the assumption that a prosperous and stable Russia is a 
socially desirable outcome. So suppose we want to learn the popular will when preferences are 
something other than self-evident and unanimous. In this instance, we need a rule with which to 
define that will, and the most generally accepted rule is majority rule. 
Of course, we are not always willing to abide by this rule. For example, even if a majority prefers 
to exclude someone from, say, participating in politics because they do not like his or her ethnic 
identity, we should not want to violate anyone's civil liberties and individual rights merely because 
a majority prefers to do so. It is for this reason that we sometimes remove decisions from politics and 
move them to things like the courts which may operate by different and more stringent rules. 
In any event, suppose we are contemplating an issue in which people agree that majority rule is 
appropriate -- that if policy A is preferred by a majority to policy B, then A is regarded as socially 
preferred to B. However, as our initial questions suggest, we cannot suppose that all major issue can 
always be reduced to two alternatives. Those who would draft a new constitution for Russia, for 
example, do not confront a simple choice between a strong president versus a strong parliament - -
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there are countless ways to form the relationship between the different branches of government. And 
the issue confronting Russia is not simply whether to hold new elections today or in 1 995. We must 
also decide the form of those elections, the form of the legislature, and the relationship of the national 
government to the different parts of the Russian Federation. 
The important fact, now, is that whenever there are more than two alternatives, we encounter 
problems when using majority rule to reach any definitive determination of the "public will." To see 
what we mean, suppose a majority prefers policy A to B, and a majority prefers B to some third 
policy C. Thus, it appears that A ought to be selected. But notice that we have said nothing about 
the relationship between A and C. Since Ais preferred to B and B is preferred.to C; we might infer 
that A is preferred to C. However, this need not be so. For example, suppose alternative A calls for 
new legislative elections; B for no elections whatsoever; and C is for a new presidential election. 
Suppose one part of society, say Yeltsin's strong supporters, prefers A to B to C. Suppose a second 
part, fearful of what new elections might bring but disgusted with Yeltsin, prefers B to C to A.  
Finally, suppose the last part, disgusted with everyone but especially the Congress, prefers C to A to 
B. Notice now that if each of these groups is equally numerous, then A is preferred to B by a 
majority (parts I and 3), B is preferred to C (parts 1 and 2), and yet C is preferred by a majority to 
A (parts 2 and 3).  
This example, although not intended to be realistic, is important for several reasons -- the most 
important one being that, since A, B, and C are each defeated in a majority vote by something, there 
is no popular will to be discovered. Nothing stands highest in the preferences of society, and nothing 
can lay unambiguous claim to being "socially most preferred." Hence, the first assumption justifying 
the legitimacy of outcomes produced by referenda -- that a popular will exists to be discovered by 
a referendum -- is not valid in all circumstances. 
Our example also shows that, instead of revealing a popular will, referenda can artificially 
manufacture that will and gives politicians the opportunity to manipulate events. Notice in particular 
that since a referendum typically allows a choice between only two alternatives -- since most 
referenda are framed in yes-or-no form -- then the final outcome in our example is determined 
wholly by which two alternatives are considered. If the referendum reads: "Should a new presidential 
election be held (A versus C)" then the outcome is C; if the referendum reads "Should new 
parliamentary elections be held (B versus C)?" then the outcome is B; and if the referendum reads 
"Should the president or the Congress be subject to new elections" (A versus B) the outcome is A. 
Employing a referendum, then, merely give those who can form the alternatives an opportunity to 
manipulate decisions rather than reveal anything about the public's preferences. 
We emphasize that this critique of referenda does not employ any assumption about the inability 
of a voter to hold sincere and informed opinions. Our argument does not require that we agree with 
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Alexander Hamilton, one of the framers of the American constitution, when he asserted that "the 
voice of the people has been said to be the voice of god; and however generally this maxim has been 
quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge 
or determine right." What Hamilton believed may be true, and precautions may have to be taken 
against such possibilities. But our concern with referenda is that even with a fully informed 
electorate, they can give a false picture of things. They can lead us to think that there is a popular 
desire to move in one direction when there is no agreement whatsoever about direction. 
In fact, voting in a democracy plays a different role than allowing the public to determine policy 
directly, and it is an error to confuse democracy with any such device. So to see voting's role and to 
see what is THE essential component of democracy, consider again the method for deciding issues that 
is implicitly or explicitly rejected whenever a decision is taken to turn to popular referenda to decide 
issues - - representative democracy. 
Suppose our elected representatives (legislators, presidents, governors, and so on) are somehow 
sensitive to the preferences of those whom they represent and serve. Then if there is no popular will, 
those representatives should be able to learn this fact. Indeed, they will have positive incentives to 
do precisely that, out of fear that their election opponents will take advantage of their ignorance. In 
addition, they will also have an incentive to learn something that referenda cannot reveal -- the 
intensity with which preferences are held. In this way, they will be in a better position to invent new 
alternatives, to weight differences in intensity, to evaluate the "fairness" of different policies, and to 
negotiate compromises. Of course, they will not necessarily do this out of good-will -- they will do 
it to preserve their positions. 
This is not to say that the current Congress is capable of doing any of these things. To repeat our 
argument from earlier essays, members of Congress have not yet adjusted to the imperatives of 
democratic elections. Nevertheless, we suspect that the confusion we see there reflects the fact that, 
given the current turmoil in the economy, there is no well-defined public will as much as it reflects 
anything else. The Congress suffers from the malady of not only not being democratically elected 
or threatened with the immediate prospect of competitive elections. But it also suffers from the 
malady of trying to represent a population with incoherent preferences. Everyone agrees that current 
circumstances are unacceptable -- everyone want a stable currency, a prosperous economy, a 
guarantee of individual rights, and some certainty of social rights. But what is the "popular will" with 
respect to the policies that must be implemented to achieve these ends? Because there does not exist 
any popular consensus on means, the conflicts within the Congress as well as between the Congress 
and the president that so entertained us, although far less structured and civil than we might prefer, 
are merely a reflection of society. 
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With this argument in hand, we can now see what a democracy is and what the role of voting is 
in it. Put simply, voting is the device the people use to choose their leaders, to choose those who they 
think represent their positions and preferences most effectively, and to replace those who they do not 
think have performed their jobs well. Political systems that allow the people to change their leaders 
through competitive elections are democracies -- all other systems are something else. A system that 
allows people to decide things by referenda -- even important things -- but that relegates the design 
of those referenda and all other decisions to an unelected elite are not democracies. 
Thus, the answer to the question that forms the title of this essay is YES. But our answer does not 
necessarily apply to voting on referenda. In evaluating a constitution, we should not focus on the 
opportunities it provides for deciding issues directly, or even on the power it gives to a president or 
the legislature to call plebiscites. These things determine the relative power of those who can call or 
design referenda with respect to the other parts of government; they do not always increase the power 
of the voters themselves. Of far greater importance in determining the responsiveness of public 
officials to the people are constitutional guarantees of meaningful and competitive elections. Will 
elections be held with sufficient frequency (is it advisable to allow all elected officials to serve for 
five-year terms)? Who controls the rules under which elections are held (we should be certain that 
they are not controlled by those who are directly governed by those rules, lest they manipulate the 
rules to their own advantage)? What direct and indirect measures does a constitution contain to assure 
that elections will be competitive (does the constitution offer promises of campaign funds that a 
majority party can manipulate)? 
It would appear, then, that we do not see any role for referenda in a democracy. In fact, that is 
not our position. We should not ignore the fact that referenda are important devices for bringing 
issues to the attention of voters and, if used properly, that they can be a device whereby voters 
constrain the actions of politicians and other public officials. For example, voters in Switzerland can 
veto legislation that affects their taxes and, in local elections in the United States, voter approval may 
be required before officials are allowed to increase public indebtedness (voters everywhere should be 
on their guard against the incentives of politicians to "spend now and pay later;'). 
The key feature of these examples is referenda are a regular part of the political process. And, 
more importantly, they are something other than a way for presidents or legislators to augment their 
political power. Because they are something other than glorified public opinion polls, voters have an 
incentive to become better informed about the things over which they have some influence. They 
are voting over something other than vague generalities that place them at the mercy of demagogues. 
As such, referenda can be a powerful inducement for voters to become better informed. But we 
hasten to add that even in these societies, referenda cannot substitute for the power voters possess in 
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deciding who shall lead or represent them. Referenda are merely an auxiliary control and not the key 
element of a democracy. 
As a caveat to this discussion, we offer the opinion that holding a referendum to decide 
constitutional issues, to resolve conflicts within the Congress or between the Congress and Yeltsin, 
are little more than abdications of responsibility. It is not that the Congress cannot act because they 
do not know the will of the people. They cannot act because that will is non-existent and because 
incentives are too weak to force hard decisions. Perhaps a constitutional referendum is required to 
break the logjam. Perhaps even an artificially created popular will is better than the present 
confusion. Perhaps we should temporarily suspend our reservations about the usefulness of referenda, 
if only to get things moving in some direction. But in doing so, we should appreciate that such 
referenda are merely stop-gap measures, and cannot substitute for an election that threatens to 
"throws the bums out." 
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